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C HAP T E R 15 
Medical Mal practice 
JAMES W. SMITH 
§15.1. Introduction. During the past decade there has been a con-
siderable increase in medical malpractice litigation and a corresponding 
rise in interest in this area of the law. Previous editions of the SURVEY 
have extensively examined major developments in medical malpractice 
within the general context of tort law. The most notable recent example 
was the discussion of the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Brune v. 
Belinkoff,1 abolshing the community standard rule.2 
The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of medical mal-
practice as a specialized field of law by focusing on four discrete prob-
lems: (1) consent of minors to medical treatment, (2) immunity, (3) 
statute of limitations, and (4) evidentiary uses of medical treatises and 
periodicals. While all of these issues ultimately go to the central question 
in medical malpractice, the liability of the physician or hospital, each 
deals with a different aspect of a typical medical malpractice case. The 
first two topics relate to statutory protection insulating the physician 
from liability; the third relates to the time in which the action must 
be brought, one of the most formidable procedural obstacles in medical 
malpractice suits; and the fourth relates to the burden of proving medical 
malpractice by expert opinion, still the most difficult and troublesome 
part of medical malpractice law. All four issues possess particular rele-
vance because they have been the subjects of recent statutory or judicial 
action in Massachusetts. Moreover, they are continually developing areas, 
posing questions in need of further clarification or resolution. 
§15.2. Minors: Consent to medical treatment. One of the most 
current problems in the legal-medical area involves the issue of minors' 
consent to medical treatment. At common law, minors are deemed in-
capable of giving consent with the result that the consent of the parent 
or legal guardian of the child is required before medical treatment can 
be administered.1 This common law rule has proved unworkable with 
the dramatic increase in the incidence of drug abuse and venereal 
disease among minors. Since many young people were reluctant to re-
JAMES W. SMITH is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
§15.1. 1 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968). 
2 See 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.16. 
§15.2. 1 See, e.g., Reddington v. Clayman, 334 Mass. 244, 134 N.E.2d 920 
(1956) (unauthorized removal of a uvula during operation to remove tonsils and 
adenoids). 
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veal these types of medical problems to their parents, they failed to 
obtain parental consent to treatment and did not receive the care they 
needed. Similarly, physicians wishing to treat such minors did so at their 
own risk, perhaps committing a battery each time they proceeded with-
out parental consent. This dilemma became particularly acute when 
such conditions gave rise to medical emergencies. 
Massachusetts, like many other states,2 has responded to this problem 
with new legislation. In 1954, the legislature enacted a statuteS providing 
that a registered physician or surgeon, acting under the authority of the 
Department of Public Health, could examine and treat a minor for 
venereal disease without the consent of the parent or legal guardian pro-
vided the minor voluntarily appeared for examination and treatment. 
The statute was among the first of its kind, and it has never been 
amended. Perhaps for that reason, its language is somewhat more re-
strictive than comparable but more recent enactments in other jurisdic-
tions which allow private doctors also to treat minors for venereal 
disease.4 Even after the enactment of the 1954 statute, there remained, 
however, a need for new law to deal with drug abuse. In 1970, the 
legislature added Section 12E to Chapter 112 of the General Laws. This 
section provides that a minor twelve years of age or over who is found 
to be drug dependent by two or more physicians may give his consent 
to hospital and medical care related to the diagnosis or treatment of 
his drug dependency. In such cases, the consent of the parent or legal 
guardian is not required. The provisions of this statute do not, however, 
apply to methadone maintenance therapy. 
Another special situation where the legislature has acted to expand 
the rights of minors to consent to medical procedures is in the area of 
surgery and treatment incident to the donation of a kidney. Under newly 
enacted legislationS a person of sound mind who is eighteen years of 
age or older may validly consent to giving a kidney for transplantation 
during his or her lifetime.6 
2 Most of this legislation has been enacted in the last five years. Only five 
states, Idaho, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia and Wyoming, have not pro-
vided for minor's consent to treatment for venereaJI disease. A majority of juris-
dictions also provide for consent to treatment for drug abuse. See, e.g., Ga. Code 
Ann., §§74-104.1 through 74-104.3 (Supp. 1972). For a compilation of statutory 
material, see Pilpel, Minors' Rights to Medical Care, 36 Albany L. Rev. 462 
(1972) . 
3 G.L., c. 111, §117. 
4 Compare Va. Code Ann., §32·137 (Supp. 1972). 
5 G.L., c. 113, §8(a), as amended by Chapter 344 of the Acts of 1972. 
6 The statute also permits such a person to make a gift of all or any part of 
his body for specified medical' purposes, such gift to take effect upon his death. 
G.L., c. 113, §8(b). The statute does not, however, deal with the matter of con-
sent in the case of minors under the age of eighteen. The likelihood is that court 
approval of a proposed transplant would be required even where both the minor 
and his parents have consented to the transplant. In 1957 the Supreme Judicial 
Court issued three opinions, each permitting a minor to donate a kidney to a 
twin sibling. In each of these cases there was a finding that the minor under-
2
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Probably the most far-reaching statute in this area is Chapter 112, 
Section 12F of the General Laws, passed in 1971. It provides that: 
No physician shall be held liable for damages for failure to obtain 
consent of a parent or parents, guardian or guardians or other per-
sons having custody or control of a minor child, or of the spouse 
of a patient, to emergency examination and treatment, including 
blood transfusions, when delay in treatment will endanger the life, 
limb, or mental well-being of the patient nor shall any hospital be 
liable for any such examination and treatment by a physician therein. 
This statute most likely codifies what would have been the common law 
result in Massachusetts had such a case arisen. Its chief feature is that 
it assures non-liability for the physician faced with an emergency situa-
tion. 
While Section 12F clearly applies in an emergency situation where 
the parents, guardian or spouse of the patient are not present or avail-
able to give consent to the needed treatment, an interesting question 
arises as to the statute's applicability where an emergency situation has 
arisen and the parent, guardian or spouse ,refuses on religious or other 
grounds to consent to the needed treatment. It is arguable that "failure 
to obtain consent" might be construed to include the situation where 
consent is refused. It is submitted, however, that such a construction was 
not intended by the legislature.7 Were the question to arise before the 
courts in Massachusetts, the likelihood is, particularly in the case of 
minors, that the physician providing the emergency treatment would be 
protected as a matter of common law.8 
stood the nature of the operation and its possible risks and consequences, and 
in all of th, cas,s th, parents of th, minors cons,nt,d to th, operation. Further, 
in all of the cases, the Court made a finding based upon the testimony of a psy-
chiatrist, that the operation was necessary for the medical weIll-being of the 
donor as well as the physical well-being of the donee. Masden v. Harrison, No. 
68651 Eq., Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 12, 1957; Huskey v. Harrison, No. 68666 
Eq., Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug. 30, 1957; Foster v. Harrison, No. 68574 Eq., 
Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 20, 1957. The opinions in these cases were not published 
in the official reports of the Court. A discussion of these cases and their potential 
ramifications appears in CUITaIl, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation 
in Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 891 (1959). 
While there are many unanswered questions in this area of the law, perhaps 
the most difficult at the present time are: (1) whether the court will' allow such 
an operation where a minor, under eighteen years of age, who understands the 
nature of the operation and the risks involved, consents, but the parents refuse 
consent; and (2) whether the court will allow such an operation where the 
potential donor is a minor of insufficient age to understand the nature of the 
operation and the risks involved, and the parents give their consent. For a dis-
cussion of some of the problems in this area see Curran and Beecher, Experi-
mentation in Children, 10 J .A.M.A. 77 (1969). 
7 If the legislature did intend to include refusal of consent situations, G.L., c. 
112, §12F should be amended so as to clearly indicate such intent. 
8 While there are no Massachusetts cases on point, where parents have refused 
3
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A question which is likely to arise in Massachusetts in the future is 
the validity of a minor;s consent to an abortion. The California Supreme 
Court in the case of Ballard v. Anderson9 held that a minor's consent 
to a therapeutic abortion was valid and that parental consent was not 
required. In that case, however, the decision was based on a statute 
which permitted an unmarried, pregnant minor to give consent to the 
furnishing of hospital, medical, and surgical care related to her preg-
nancy."10 The court, erroneously I believe, held that "surgical care re-
lated to her pregnancy" encompassed a therapeutic abortion despite the 
fact that the Therapeutic Abortion Actll was enacted 14 years after the 
statute in question. Three judges dissented, taking the position that the 
obvious legislative purpose of the consent statute was to preserve the 
unborn life, not to destroy it.12 Massachusetts, as of this date, has no 
comparable statute. It is doubtful that the emergency treatment law, 
as currently worded, would be construed to insulate the physician from 
liability where he performs an abortion on a minor without obtaining 
parental consent. This point should be clarified by the legislature in the 
light of the recent Supreme Court pronouncements regarding abortion.13 
on religious grounds to allow medical treatment to a minor, and such treatment 
was needed to save the child from death or serious bodily harm, courts in other 
jurisdictions have ordered compulsory treatment, usually by appointing the hos-
pital administrator as temporary guardian of the. child for the purpose of giving 
consent to the trea:tment. See Matter of Brooklyn Hospital v. Torres, 45 Misc. 
2d 914, 258 N.Y.S. 2d 621 (Sup. Ct. Special Term 1965); State v. Perricone, 
37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962). The Perricone opinion cited the l'anguage 
in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944), where it was said that 
U[P]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow 
that they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children 
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make 
that choice for themselves." 37 N.J. 463, 473-474, 181 A.2d 751.757 (1962). 
While there is a difference between the situation where the court in effect 
orders the emergency treatment, despite the refusal of the parent to consent to 
it and the situation where the physician himself makes that determination, situ~ 
ations will no doubt arise where, due to the nature of the emergency, time is 
not available to seek even a speedy judicial determination of the matter. Since 
the courts have in the case of minors consistently ordered the needed medical 
treatment, where time prevents the obtaining of judicial approval, the courtS 
would no doubt hold the physician who acts not liable in any subsequent litiga-
tions. 
9 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971). 
10 Ca:l. Civ. Code, §34.5 (West 1954). 
11 Cal. Health & Saf. Code, §§25950-25954 (West Supp. 1972). Prior to this 
statute abortions were permitted only in emergency situations when necessary to 
preserve the life of the mother. 
12 4 Cal. 3d 873, 885, 484 P.2d 1345, 1354, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10 (1971). The 
interpretation of the statute in the Anderson case related to a therapeutic abortion 
and would not appear to be authority in California where the abortion is not 
based upon preserving the health of the minor. 
13 Roe v. Wade,-U.S.-, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton,-U.S.-, 
93 S. Ct. 739 (1973). 
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In addition to these "crisis" situations, there remains the general 
question of a minor's right to consent to ordinary medical treatment. 
Some states have enacted legislation allowing minors to consent to such 
treatment if they are living away from home.14 In Massachusetts, it 
seems clear that in non-emergency situations the consent of the parent 
or legal guardian is required where the minor is incapable of under-
standing and appreciating the nature and likely consequences of medical 
treatment.1!i There are no Massachusetts cases which determine whether 
consent is required where the minor is of sufficient age and maturity to 
understand and appreciate the nature and likely consequences of the 
treatment,14 and cases in other jurisdictions are divided}!i 
§15.3. Immunity: Charities and emergency treatment. Within the 
past decade, the Massachusetts legislature has acted upon two aspects 
of immunity relevant to medical malpractice. The results are most inter-
esting because the General Court went in different directions on the two 
questions. By abolishing the doctrine of absolute charitable immunity, 
the path was paved for suits against hospitals based on the negligence 
of their staffs. Yet, statutory immunity was conferred upon physicians 
and nurses rendering emergency medical treatment, thus barring mal-
practice. suits in those circumstances. 
Charitable o.rganizations. Since the 1876 decision of McDonald v. 
Massachusetts General Hospital} most hospitals, as charitable organiza-
tions, enjoyed total immunity from liability in tort with respect to the 
conduct of their agents while engaged in charitable activities. The theory 
behind this doctrine was that funds donated for charitable purposes 
should not be diverted. Even when liability insurance became available 
at a relatively small cost, the doctrine of charitable immunity continued 
14 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code, §34.6, applying to minors fifteen years of age or 
older. 
1!i See note 1, supra. 
16 In an opinion of the Attorney General, (Op. Atty. Gen. Feb. 9, 1966, p. 
247) the view is expressed that "if a patient has not attained his majority and 
is unmarried, the consent of his parents, as natural guardians, is necessary." 
17 The conservative view is that the consent of the minor alone is insufficient, 
irrespective of the nature of the treatment or surgery and irrespective of the 
understanding of the minor. See, e.g., Bonner v. Maran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 
1941) (consent by a boy of fifteen years to a skingrafting operation held invalid). 
The more liberal view holds that the consent of a minor approaching maturity to 
relatively simple treatment or surgery will be valid. See Gulf & S.I.R. Co. v. 
Sullivan, 155 Miss. 1, 119 So. 501 (1928) (consent by a seventeen year old minor 
to a vaccination held valid); Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 
(1956) (consent by eighteen year old plaintiff to a plastic surgery operation on 
her nose helti valid). See Note, Torts-Battery---Consent of Minor to Simple 
Operation as a Defense, 10 Vand. L. Rev. 619 (1957) and Note, Assault and 
Battery-Lack of Parenta:1 Consent to an Operation as a Basis for Liability, 9 
West. Res. L. Rev. 101 (1957) for discussions of the Lacey decision. There appear 
to be no cases dealing with the validity of consent by a minor to major medical 
treatment or surgery. 
§l5.3. 1 120 Mass. 432 (1876). 
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to be applied,2 and became imbedded in the common law of Massa-
chusetts.3 
A major chink in the armor of charitable immunity appeared in 1969. 
In Colby v. Carney Hospi.tal4 the Supreme Judicial Court, while apply-
ing the doctrine of charitable immunity, stated that "we take this occa-
sion to give adequate warning that the next time we are squarely 
confronted by a legal question respecting the charitable immunity doc-
trine it is our intention to abolish it."5 This admonition, while putting 
potential charitable organization defendants on notice of an imminent 
change in the law, was also directed at the legislature. The subsequent 
enactment of Section 85K of Chapter 231 of the General Laws6 made 
judicial abolition unnecessary.' 
Section 85K provides that charitable organizations may be liable in 
tort. If the tort was committed in the course of any activity carried on 
to accomplish directly the charitable purposes of the organization, liability 
in any such cause of action may not exceed the sum of $20,000, ex-
clusive of interests and costs. The $20,000 limitation does not apply if 
2 In fact the charitable immunity doctrine was applied even where the particu-
lar charity carried liability insurance and thus where recovery by the plaintiff 
would not have diverted funds held for charitable purposes. McKay v. Morgan 
Memorial Co-op. Industries & Stores, Inc. 272 Mass. 121, 172 N.E. 68 (1930). 
3 In 1958, in the case of Simpson v. Truesdale Hospital, Inc., 338 Mass. 787, 
154 N.E.2d 357 (1958) the Supreme Judicial Court stated: "While as an original 
proposition the doctrine might not commend itself to us today, it has been firmly 
imbedded in our law for three quarters of a century and we think that 'its termi-
nation should be at legisl'ative, rather than at judicial, hands.''' Id. at 787-88, 
154 N.E.2d at 358. This statement reflected an underlying consideration which 
was in conflict with the Court's desire to abolish the rule. Judicial abolition might 
have the effect of subjecting a charitabl'e organization to tort liability for an act 
committed prior to the abolition but within the statute of limitations, where the 
charitable organization, having relied upon the charitable immunity doctrine, was 
uninsured. Abolition by the legislature, on the other hand, would operate pro-
spectively. 
4 356 Mass. 527, 254 N.E.2d 407 (1969). 
5 Id. at 528, 254 N.E.2d at 408. 
6 See Acts of 1971, c. 785, § 1. 
, It seems to have been assumed by some that the Colby decision abolished 
charitable immunity. For example, in the language decl'aring Chapter 785 of the 
Acts of 1971 to be an emergency measure, the purpose of the Act is set out as 
limiting the liability of charitable organizations, whereas in actuality the Act was 
creating liability up to twenty-thousand dollars. In a 1972 decision, Ricker v. 
Northeastern University, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 299, 279 N.E.2d 671, the plaintiff 
sought recovery against a charity where the cause of action arose prior to the 
enactment of G.L., c. 231, §85K. The plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to 
recover under the following language of the Colby opinion: ce ••• the next time 
we are squarely confronted ... it is our intention to abolish it [charitable im-
munity]." The Court, applying the charitable immunity doctrine, held that the 
language in the Colby opinion did not by itself abolish the doctrine and that since 
the legislature had acted, judicial abolition was not warranted. The Court further 
held that there is no indication in the statute that it was intended to have retro-
spective effect. 
6
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the tort was committed in the course of activities primarily commercial 
in character even though carried on to obtain revenue to be used for 
charitable purposes.s Considering the proportional reduction in insurance 
premium costs as liability coverage increases, it is not clear why the 
legislature set a ceiling on the liability of charitable organizations rather 
than completely abolishing the doctrine; perhaps it was to protect self-
insuring charitable organizations from financial ruination. 
It should be noted that the $20,000 limitation of liability is applicable 
to a cause of action rather than to a wrongful act. Thus, if several per-
sons were injured as the result of a negligent act on the part of the agent 
of a charitable organization, the $20,000 limitation would apply separately 
as to each plaintiff. Likewise, it would appear that if the negligent act 
of the agent of a charity caused injury to a person from which injury 
the person subsequently died, the $20,000 limitation would apply sep-
arately to the count for pain and suffering and separately to the count 
for wrongful death these being severable and distinct harms.9 
The abolition of the total immunity enjoyed by charitable organiza-
tions may make hospitals liable for the acts of their servants under the 
doctrine of lrespondeat superior. It will be important to determine 
whether a physician treating a patient in a hospital should be treated 
as a servant of the hospital rather than an independent contmctor ;10 
whether the nurse or intern who assists the doctor in treating a patient 
is the servant of the hospital, the borrowed servant of the doctor or the 
servant or both,l1 or whether the X-ray technician is a servant or in-
dependent contractor.12 
S This part of the statute merely codifies the common law. See McKay v. 
Morgan Memorial Stores, Inc., note 2, supra, holding that a charity is liable for 
the negligence of its agents with respect to activities which are primarily com-
mercial in character even though such activities are carried on to obtain revenue 
to be used for charitable purposes. 
9 While the executor or administrator maintains both actions, recovery for the 
decedent's pain and suffering prior to death becomes part of the decedent's estate, 
whereas recovery for wrongful death enures to the benefit of the statutory bene-
ficiaries and is not part of the decedent's estate. See Maltzman v. Hertz, 336 
Mass. 704, 147 N.E.2d 767 (1958). See also Wall v. Massachusetts Northeastern 
Street Railway Co., 229 Mass. 506, 118 N.E. 864 (1918). 
10 For collected cases on the liability of a hospital for the negligence of a 
doctor see 69 A.L.R.2d. 305. 
11 See Barrette v. Hight, 353 Mass. 268, 230 N.E.2d 808 (1967), holding the 
defendant doctor, the chief of surgery at a hospital, not liable for the negligence 
of a resident in surgery even though at the time of the injury the resident was 
"somewhat" under the direction and control of the defendant-doctor. See also 
Ramsland v. Shaw, 341 Mass. 56, 166 N.E.2d 894 (1960), Klucken v. Levi, 293 
Mass. 545, 200 N.E. 566 (1936), and Guell' v. Tenney, 262 Mass. 54, 159 N.E. 
451 (1928) holding the doctor not liable for injury resulting to his patient from 
the negligence of a hospital nurse. See also other cases collected in 14 A.L.R.3d 
873, 880, 37 A.L.R.2d 1284, and 72 A.L.R.2d 408, 418. 
12 See 41 A.L.R.2d 329, 369. In Withington v. Jennings, 253 Mass. 484, 149 
N.E. 201 (1925), the defendant doctor, who was in charge of the X-ray depart-
ment of a hospital, was held not liable for the negligence of an X-ray technician. 
7
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Emergency treatment. Massachusetts follows the common law rule 
that, absent some special relationship between the parties which is re-
garded as sufficient to impose a duty to act,13 a person is not liable for 
his failure to render assistance to prevent injury or death to another, 
irrespective of the slightness of the burden of rendering aid. This rule 
pertains whether the failure to render aid was inadvertent14 or inten-
tional.15 It stems principally from a reluctance on the part of the courts 
to transform moral obligations into legal duties. It also reflects concern 
for the practical problems that would arise if recovery were generally 
allowed for nonfeasance.16 On the other hand, a person who undertakes 
to render assistance to an injured or helpless person will be liable if, 
in rendering assistance or attempting a rescue, he fails to exercise ordinary 
care,17 
The Court hel'd that the technician was not the servant of the doctor but rather 
a fellow employee. 
13 See, e.g., Newman v. Redstone, 354 Mass. 379, 237 N.E.2d 666 (1968), 
wherein the Supreme Judicial Court assumed without deciding it would follow the 
rule of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §512 (1957), imposing a legal 
obligation on an employer to exercise reasonable care to avert threatened harm 
to an employee, and, if the employee is hurt, to give first aid and care for him 
untH he can be cared for by others. See also Carey v. New Yorker of Worcester, 
Inc., 355 Mass. 450, 245 N.E.2d 420 (1969) and Marra v. Botta Corporation, ¥6 
Mass. 569, 254 N.E.2d 418 (1970), involving the duty owed by the owner of a 
business establishment to prevent injury to one of its patrons, and Brown v. 
Knight, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1469, 285 N.E.2d 790, involving the duty of a paid 
custodian of a child to take affirmative protective steps to prevent injury to the 
child from the conduct of others. 
14 Lacey v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 219 (D.C. Mass. 1951). 
15 Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928). 
16 One problem is assessing the degree of risk to which a rescuer must be sub-
ject before he could be legally excused from acting. Would a fair swimmer be 
obligated to effect the rescue of a person drowning a hundred yards offshore? If 
ten persons were present at the time of drowning which could have been pre-
vented, would all ten be held liable? Would a person be liable if he was, through 
his fault, unaware of the victim's peril or unable to help him? For example, would 
an intoxicated person be held liable if, had he been sober, he could have rescued 
the victim? 
17 It is not entirely clear that Massachusetts accepts this common law rule. 
In an early case, Griswold v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 183 Mass. 434, 437, 67 
N.E. 354, 356 (1903), the Court rejected the so called "Good Samaritan Rule" 
with the statement: "If it is law, no humane or gratuitous act could be done 
without subjecting the doer of it to an action on the ground that the defendant 
ought to have acted more quickly or with more judgment. It is a doctrine which 
would allow an action against a good Samaritan and let a priest and a Levite go 
free." 
Yet in a later case, Black v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 193 
Mass. 448, 79 N.E. 797 (1907), the Court held the defendant railroad liable 
where its servants assisted an intoxicated passenger from the train but left him 
half way up a flight of stairs. The passenger subsequently fell and was injured. 
The Court stated: "They [the conductors] were under no obligation to remove 
him from the car, or to provide for his safety after he left the car. But they 
8
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These conunon law doctrines have placed physicians in a morally if 
not legally perplexing situation. The nature of their profession would 
. appear to dictate that they assist someone in emergency conditions yet 
the potential threat of -liability in negligence for being a "Good Samari-
tan" has caused doctors to hesitate to render such services. Many doctors 
have contended that since there is no legal obligation to provide any 
assistance, they should not be exposed to liability when voluntarily ren-
dering emergency treatment.18 
Any possibility of a medical boycott of emergency situations was 
drastically decreased by the enactment of G.L., c. 112, §12B in 1962. 
Under the present version of Section 12B: 19 
No physician duly registered ... and no nurse duly registered ... 
who, in good faith, as a volunteer and without fee, renders emergency 
care or treatment, other than in the ordinary course of his practice, 
shaH be liable in a suit for damages as a result of his acts or omis-
sions, nor shall he be liable to a hospital for its expenses if, under 
such emergency conditions, he orders a person hospitalized or causes 
his admission. 
The statute is self-explanatory. Only the terms "in good faith"20 and 
"other than in the ordinary course of his practice"21 may require further 
voluntarily undertook to help him from the car, and they were bound to use 
ordinary care in what they did that might affect his safety. Not only in the act 
of removal, but in the place where they left him, it was their duty to have reason-
able regard for his safety in view of his manifest condition." Id. at 450, 79 N.E. 
at 798. 
It is possible to distinguish the holding in the Black case from the Court's 
language in the Griswold opinion, as there is a difference between the negligent 
rendering of aid to an iII, injured or imperiled individual and the negligent act of 
taking a helpless person from a position of relative safety and placing him in a 
position of extreme danger. 
18 See Note, California Good Samaritan Legislation: Exemptions from Civil 
Liability While Rendering Emergency Medical Aid, 51 Cal. L. Rev. 816 (1963); 
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § ,at 344 (4th ed. 1971). 
19 Since enacted in 1962 (Chapter 217 of the Acts of 1962) G.L., c. 112, 
§12B has been amended four times. 
20 If "good faith" refers to motive it is difficult to imagine someone rendering 
emergency treatment in bad faith. The term may refer to the absence of wilful 
and wanton conduct such as an abandonment of the victim. 
21 Presumably the language "other than in the ordinary course of practice" 
excludes emergencies occurring in a hospital or a doctor's office where the neces-
sary equipment and assistance is available. It is not clear whether it would 
exclude an emergency call by a doctor to a heart attack victim at his home. 
The likelihood is that it woultl. exclude such a visit, particularly since such calls 
are not normally performed gratuitously. The spirit of the language seems to 
encompass solely the situation where a doctor or nurse happens to be in a place, 
other than a hospital or doctor's office, when an emergency arises. For a discussion 
of the problem of interpretation of this type of statute see Comment, Good Sa-
maritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 Col. L. Rev. 1301, 1308-1311 
(1964). 
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clarification within the context of an actual case. To date, no cases have 
arisen in Massachusetts under this section. 
Enactment of Section 12B was clearly warranted in light of the legis-
lative policy to encourage physicians to aid people in dire need of 
expert medical treatment. Viewed as an exception to the Good Samari-
tan rule, the only remaining question is whether the legislature should 
not proceed to abrogate that doctrine in its entirety.22 
§15.4. Statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases. In the 
case of Capucci v. Barone,l decided in 1929, the defendant-surgeon left 
a sponge in the plaintiff's abdominal cavity during an operation. The 
presence of the sponge was not discovered until two years following the 
operation. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the plaintiff's mal-
practice action against the surgeon was barred by the two year statute 
of limitations. G.L., c. 260, §4 then required a tort action for malpractice 
to be commenced "within two years next after the cause of action ac-
crues."2 That requirement was construed to mean two years from 
the date of the surgeon's misconduct or negligent act, namely the 
date of the surgery; it did not mean two years from the date that the 
foreign object was discovered in the plaintiff's body.3 
In following years many other jurisdictions, deciding the issue under 
similar statutes, rejected the Capucci approach because it produced un-
just results. Some jurisdictions have treated such an act by a doctor 
as a continuing negligence, holding that the cause of action accrued 
when the foreign object was removed. Other jurisdictions employed 
various fictions holding either that the surgical operation on the plaintiff 
may not be viewed as complete until the wound has been closed and all 
appliances used in the operation have been removed or that some con-
structive fraud tolled the running of the statute of limitations. More 
recently, some courts have simply taken the position that in medical 
malpractice cases the statute of limitations commences to run when the 
22 A few states have enacted statutes providing limited protection to all persons 
who render emergency care in good faith. Thus, a New Mexico statute (N.M. 
Stat. Ann. §12-12-3 (Rep!. Vo!' 3 1953)), provides in part: "No person who 
shall administer emergency care in good faith at or near the scene of an emer-
gency . . . shall be held liable for any civir damages as a result of any action or 
omission by such person in administering said care, except for gross negligence; 
" 
Massachusetts recently extended the exemption from civil liability for good 
faith emergency treatment to members of a ski patrol duly registered in the 
National Ski Patrol system. See G.L., c. 231, §85I added by Chapter 349 of the 
Acts of 1970. 
§15.4. 1 266 Mass. 578,165 N.E. 653 (1929). 
2 The two year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions was first 
adopted by c. 319, §1 of the Acts of 1921, amending G.L., c. 260, §4. The critical 
amendment extending the period of limitation from two to three years was added 
in 1965 by c. 302 of the Acts of 1965. 
3 266 Mass. at 580, 165 N.E. at 654-55. 
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plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care; should know of 
his condition.4 
Some states have dealt with this problem legislatively, by enacting 
statutes which combine a discovery rule with an outer limit.5 Under this 
approach, the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the 
negligence has been discovered but the action must still be brought with 
a designated period of time from the date of medical treatment. Such 
a proposal came before the Massachusetts legislature in 1965. House 
Bill 530 would have amended G.L., c. 260, §4 to provide that "actions 
of contract or tort for malpractice, error or mistake . . . shall be com-
menced within two years next after the injured party has knowledge of 
the facts which give rise to a cause of action but only within five years 
after the cause of action accrues." This bill, with a "sliding scale dis-
covery" rule and a five year "outer limit" was sent to the Senate with 
only one change: the five year "outer limit" was excised leaving only 
the two year "sliding scale discovery" rule. The Senate rejected that 
proposed amendment and adopted instead a substitute measure, Senate 
Bill 924. The Senate version merely republished G.L., c. 260, §4, but 
extended the statute of limitations for malpractice actions to three years. 
Against this backdrop came Pasquale v. Chandler.6 In that case, the 
defendant-surgeon left a Kelly clamp in the patient's abdominal cavity. 
A Kelly clamp is similar in appearance to a pair of scissors; it is ap-
proximately eight inches long, with curved serrated jaws and a ratchet 
type lock. The clamp was not discovered and removed from the patient 
until approximately six years after the operation at which time it was 
rusted and broken. The plaintiff died several months thereafter. The 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed directed verdicts for the defendant-
surgeon on counts for wrongful death and for pain and suffering be-
cause the two year statutes of limitations barred relief. The Court 
indicated that it might have been disposed to reconsider the rule set 
down in the Capucci decision were it not for the very recent legislative 
history of House Bill 530;7 however, the legislature's rejection of a 
sliding scale rule, even with a five year outer limit, was viewed as an 
affirmance of the Capucci ruling. In that light, the Court believed it 
could not overrule Capucci without doing damage to fundamental na-
tions of judicial self-restraint and deference to legislative policy-making 
4 For a collection of cases, see 80 A.L.R.2d 368. 
5 See, e.g., Ala. Code, tit. 7, §25[l] (Supp. 1972) and Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§52-584 (Supp. 1973). 
6 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966). 
7 The Court in the Pasquale case held that a directed verdict was improperly 
granted on the count for pain and suffering against a second doctor-defendant, 
with respect to a claim of negligence on his part for failure to diagnose and treat 
the patient properly following his operation. Both the defendant-doctor and one 
other physician testified that examination by X-ray was the proper medical practice 
in diagnosing such complaints as Pasquale's. The defendant-doctor Ilad failed to 
order an X-ray during the six year period. 
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functions. As a legal process problem, it appears reasonably clear that 
the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in the Pasquale case is cor-
rect. Establishing the time for the accrual of a cause of action in a 
malpractice case is properly a legislative function. Certainly if G.L., 
c. 260, §4 expressly provided that such a cause of action shall accrue 
on the date of the defendant's negligence or misconduct, this language 
could not be ignored by the Court. Although Section 4 did not expressly 
provide to that effect, the legislative history suggested that interpreta-
tion. 
Yet, this does not mean that the issue has been satisfactorily resolved. 
It now rests with the legislature. The General Court, as it has recently 
done in other areas of tort law,8 should move to correct the unfair result 
which the Supreme Judicial Court was compelled to reach in Pasquale. 
There is no need for an absolute repose theory for the statute of limita-
tions in this area. Proper legislation in this area should contain no outer 
limit in which the action must be brought. Rather, the plaintiff should 
be required to maintain his action within two years from the time that 
he knew of his injury.9 
This rule would not work a manifest injustice upon the defendant-
doctor. In the rare case where the plaintiff does not know of his injury 
until long after the operation, the absence of records or witnesses or 
the dimming of memories occasioned by long delay is more detrimental 
to the plaintiff who has the burden of establishing the physician's negli-
gence than it is to the defendant-doctor. Since the plaintiff is unlikely to 
have independent evidence of the doctor's negligence, both parties will 
essentially rely upon hospital records, the testimony of hospital per-
sonnel, etc. In other words, the evidentiary burden will fall equally on 
plaintiff and defendant. 
§15.5. Evidentiary uses of medical treatises, periodicals, pamphlets, 
etc. in medical malpractice cases. Despite some recent major develop-
ments in the area of medical malpractice l the greatest practical problem 
8 See, e.g., G.L., c. 231, §85K, enacted in 1971, abolishing the charitable 
immunity doctrine up to the first $20,000 in damages; G.L., c. 231, §85L, en-
acted in 1971, changing the duty of a host driver to a guest to one of ordinary 
care; G.L., c. 106, §2-318, amended in 1971, holding manufacturers, sellers, and 
suppliers of goods liable in damages for breach of warranty despite the absence 
of privity between the plaintiff and defendant; and more recently, Acts of 1972, 
c. 665, amending G.L., c. 186, §19, substantially changing the duty owed by a 
landlord to his tenant relative to unsafe conditions of the premises. 
9 Language to the effect that the statute of limitations should commence to 
run when the plaintiff, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of 
his injury is not recommended. Such language has little practicall significance 
when applied to a statute of limitations of this nature and is too indefinite a 
standard for the commencement of the running of the statute of limitations, at 
least in this situation. 
§I5.5. 1 See, e.g., Brune v. BelinkofF, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968) 
which abolished the community standard rule in malpractice cases. For a dis-
cussion of the Brune decision see 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.16. 
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in the field is the same as it was ten years ago: the difficulty in obtaining 
the testimony of expert witnesses. Massachusetts courts correctly main-
tain the rule that: 
It is only in exceptional cases that a jury instructed by common 
knowledge and experience may without the aid of expert medical 
opinion determine whether the conduct of a physician toward a 
patient is violative of the special duty which the law imposes as a 
consequence of this particular relationship.2 
All of the recent cases on point involved the question of whether expert 
testimony was necessary in the particular case to prove negligence or 
causation.3 
2 Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 139, 181 N.E.2d 562, 565 (1962). 
3 For recent cases holding that no expert testimony was required see Lipman 
v. Lustig, 346 Mass. 182, 190 N.E.2d 675 (1963) (defendant-dentist dropped a 
reamer into the plaintiff's throat-stomach surgery was required); Delaney v. 
Rosenthall, 347 Mass. 143, 196 N.E.2d 878 (1964) (failure of defendant-doctor 
to properly treat an obviously infected thumb and a:llowing plaintiff's thumb to 
be treated principally by an inexperienced nurse's aid, resulting in serious com-
plications); Alexandridis v. Jewett, 388 F.2d 829 (1st Cir. 1968) (failure of 
defendant-obstetrician to reasonably respond to plaintiff's telephone cal1 that she 
was in labor, resulting in serious complications). In some cases the expert testi-
mony was supplied by the defendant-doctor's admissions. Manzoni v. Hamlin, 348 
Mass. 770, 202 N.E.2d 264 (1964); Waters v. Dana, 348 Mass. 796, 206 N.E.2d 
87 (1965); Pasquale v. Chandler, 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966). For 
cases holding that expert testimony was required see Erban v. Kay, 342 Mass. 
779, 174 N.E.2d 667 (1961) (cause of cardiac arrest during an operation); 
Barrette v. Hight, 353 Mass. 268 230 N.E.2d 808 (1967) (proper procedure for 
a "cutdown"); Lyons v. Cambridge Clinic Inc., 355 Mass. 800, 247 N.E.2d 700 
(1969) (removal of a tooth from a fractured jaw); Civitarese v. Gorney, 1971 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 121, 266 N.E.2d 668 (causation-relation of postoperative bleed-
ing, infectious hepatitis, and acute pyelbnephritis to failure of defendant to take 
routine preoperative tests); McCarthy v. Boston City Hospital, 1971 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 109, 266 N.E.2d 292 (administration of intensive radiation therapy treat-
ments). The most interesting Massachusetts decision in this area is Haggerty v. 
McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 181 N.E.2d 562 (1962). In the Haggerty case, the 
evidence at the trial showed that the defendant doctor performed an appendectomy 
upon the plaintiff. The defendant had some doubt as to whether he had been 
able to remove the entire appendix but failed to communicate that doubt to the 
plaintiff. Approximately eight years later the plaintiff, now living out-of-state, 
consulted .a doctor complaining of pain. As a consequence of the plaintiff's telling 
this doctor that his appendix had been removed and the visible scar in the 
appendix area, the doctor omitted certain standard tests which would have shown 
an appendicitis. Later the plaintiff's appendix ruptured causing serious compli-
cations which would not have occurred had the appendix been timely removed. 
The plaintiff sued the first doctor claiming that his negligence in failing to inform 
him after the first operation that his appendix may not have been removed entirely 
was the cause of his subsequent harm. In a four to three decision the Supreme 
Judicial Court upheld a directed verdict for the defendant taking the position 
that it was incumbent on the plaintiff to show by expert medical testimony that 
an incomplete removal' of the appendix in the circumstances created a definable 
and substantial medical risk and that this was known, or should have been known, 
to the surgeon. 
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In 1949 the Massachusetts Legislature, in an effort to ameliorate the 
difficulties inherent in obtaining expert testimony, enacted G.L., c. 233, 
§79C. In essence, Section 79C permitted the use of medical treatises 
and periodicals "in the discretion of the court," to supply evidence 
necessary for the plaintiff to avoid a directed verdict in a medical mal-
practice case. Section 79C required, however, that the court find that 
the evidence was relevant and "that the writer of such statement is 
recognized in his profession or calling as an expert on the subject .... "4 
Fifteen years after its enactment, Section 79C was described as rela-
tively ineffective in avoiding miscarriages of justice in medical mal-
practice cases caused by the absence of expert testimony.5 The failure 
of Section 79C to achieve its purpose has been ascribed to the Supreme 
Judicial Court's restrictive view of how the plaintiff must establish to 
the court's satisfaction that the author is "'recognized in his profession 
or calling as an expert on the subject. . . .'''6 The question raised, but 
never expressly answered by the Court, is whether the plaintiff must 
produce the testimony of a medical expert to vouch for the author's 
expertise. If so, the goal of the statute, to create alternatives to actual 
expert testimony, is perhaps fatally frustrated. 
Where plaintiffs have attempted to utilize treatises pursuant to Sec-
tion 79C without actually producing the testimony of a medical expert, 
they have failed. In Reddington v. Clayman,' the trial judge excluded 
a treatise which was offered under Section 79C because of lack of evi-
dence that the author was recognized in his profession or calling as an 
expert on the subject. In approving the exclusion of this treatise, the 
Supreme Judicial Court considered and rejected several methods which 
would have obviated the need for expert testimony to vouch for the 
author's expertise. The biographical data in the front of the book could 
not be used to establish the author's expertise because such statements 
4 G.L., c. 233, §79C provides: 
Statements of facts or opinions on a subject of science or art contained 
in a published treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet shall, in so far as the 
court shaH find that the said statements are relevant and that the writer of 
such statements is recognized in his profession or calling as an expert on 
the subject, be admissible in actions of contract or tort for mal'practice, 
error or mistake against physicians, surgeons, dentists, optometrists, hospi-
tals and sanitaria, as evidence tending to prove said facts or as opinion 
evidence; provided, however, that the party intending to offer as evidence 
any such statements shall, not less than thirty days before the trial of the 
action, give the adverse party or his attorney notice of such intention, stating 
the name of the writer of the .statements, the title of the treatise, periodical, 
book or pamphlet in which they are contained, the date of publication of 
the same, the name of the publisher of the same, and wherever possible or 
practicable the page or pages of the same on which the said statements 
appear. 
5 See Kehoe, Massachusetts Malpractice Evidentiary Statute-Success or Fail-
ure? 44 B.U.L. Rev. 10,29 (1964). 
6 Id. at 21-29; 3 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law. §22.6 (1956). 
7 334 Mass. 244, 134 N.E.2d 920 (1956). 
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are hearsay. The Court also rebuffed the plaintiff's attempt to establish 
the author's expertise through two other books, the DirectoiTY of Medical 
Specialists and an English edition of Who's Who. Judicial notice of 
these books was ruled out without discussion. The Court further sug-
gested that these books would probably not be admissible under G.L., 
c. 233, §79B8 as "[fJact statements published for persons in a particular 
occupation" in the absence of independent evidence that the compilation 
is used and relied upon by persons engaged in that occupation. Redding-
ton thus appears to require another expert witness to establish the ex-
pertise of the author of the writing offered under Section 79C. To satisfy 
the court, this witness must testify that the author of the writing is an 
expert, or that the compilation sought to be admitted under Section 79B 
to prove that the author is an expert under Section 79C, is a compilation 
which is commonly used and relied upon by persons engaged in a parti-
cular occupation. 
In Ramsland v. Shaw9 the plaintiff attempted to introduce in evidence 
a treatise by Dr. R. R. MacIntosh, an English doctor, entitled Lumbar 
Puncture ,and Spinal Analgesia. He attempted to establish the expertise 
of Dr. MacIntosh by resort to Section 79B, using the 1957 edition of 
Who's Who together with the testimony of a city librarian. The trial 
court excluded the testimony of the city librarian and excluded the 
treatise despite the fact that the defendant-doctor himself gave evidence 
that would have warranted a finding that Dr. MacIntosh was a recog-
nized expert in the field of anesthesia. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial 
Court affirmed the ruling of the trial judge that it was unnecessary to 
determine whether the book Who's Who was improperly excluded since 
the admissibility of the medical treatise was within the trial judge's dis-
cretion under the statute. to The Court found no abuse of discretion where 
the trial judge excluded the treatise by relying upon the locality rule.11 
The interesting issue raised by Reddington and Ramsland is the re-
lationship between Sections 79B and 79C of Chapter 233. The use of 
a collateral writing to vouch for the expertise of 'the author of a medical 
8 G.L., c. 233, §79B provides: 
Statements of facts of general' interest to persons engaged in an occupation 
contained in a list, register, periodical, book or other compilation, issued to 
the public, shall, in the discretion of the court, if the court finds that the 
compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation 
and commonly is used and relied upon by them, be admissib~e in civil cases 
as evidence of the truth of any fact so stated. 
9 341 Mass. 56, 166 N.E.2d 894 (1960). 
10 A 1965 amendment to Section 79C deleted the language "in the discretion 
of the court" from the sta:tute. See Acts of 1965, c. 425. 
11 The trial judge reasoned that since Dr. MacIntosh was an English physician 
and his treatise was published in England, his work should not be controlling 
because of possible differences in anesthesia techniques in England and in the 
locality involved in the case. The issue of whether the locality rule was to be 
incorporated by implication into Section 79C has been rendered moot by the 
decision in Brune v. Bel'inkoff, note 1, supra. 
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writing under C.L., c. 233, §79C is hearsay unless it comes within the 
language of the statutory exception found in C.L., c. 233, §79B. Section 
79B provides for the admissibility of "[s Jtatements of fact of general 
interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a ... compila-
tion ... if the court finds that the compilation is published for the use 
of persons engaged in that occupation and commonly is used and relied 
upon by them." (Emphasis added). 
The problems presented by the narrow scope and ambiguity of Section 
79B can be illustrated by the Ramsland case. There the plaintiff at-
tempted to establish the expertise of the author of the medical writing 
by offering Who's Who in support of such expertise, accompanied by the 
testimony of a librarian that Who's Who is commonly used and relied 
upon. There is considerable doubt as to whether a statement appearing 
in a general compilation such as Who's Who, attesting to the expertise 
of an author of a medical treatise, is a "statement of fact" within the 
contemplation of Section 79B. The question of the author's standing 
within his calling or profession is more dearly a matter of expert opinion 
than it is a matter of fact. Even if this threshold obstacle is surmounted, 
there is a further question concerning the meaning and scope of the 
term "occupation." Is it broad enough to embrace a librarian's testimony 
that the compilation is commonly used and relied upon by librarians? 
When considered in relation to Section 79C, it is the author's view that 
it clearly is not. What would be required is a doctor's testimony that the 
compilation is used and relied upon by persons engaged in the medical 
field. Thus, even this route to admissibility requires a physician's testi-
mony. 
Recent developments affecting the operation of C.L., c. 233, §79C, have 
not appreciably alleviated the difficulties in applying it. A 1965 amend-
ment to Section 79C deleted the language "in the discretion of the court" 
from the statute.12 Thus, the correctness of the trial judge's exclusion 
of a medical treatise or periodical is no longer determined by the "abuse 
of discretion" standard. The same amendment also increased the time 
period for giving notice of an intention to use a treatise or periodical 
from three days to thirty days before the trial and required that the 
notice, wherever possible or practicable, specify the page or pages of 
the treatise or periodical containing the statements relied upon by the 
party.13 The decision in Brune v. BelinkofJ,14 abolishing the "locality 
rule" in Massachusetts, meant that the author of the writing offered 
under Section 79C would not have to be qualified as an expert on the 
particular matter according to the standard of the community in which 
the defendant practiced medicine. 
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the apparent purpose 
12 See note to, supra. 
13 See 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law, §22.2. 
14 See note 1, supra. 
15 See Duarte, petitioner, 331 Mass. 747, 122 N.E.2d 890 (1954). 
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of G.L., c. 233, §79C was to provide a substitute for the expert medical 
witness in medical malpractice cases. Such substitute was deemed neces-
sary because of the inability of plaintiffs, in medical malpractice cases, 
to obtain the testimony of fellow members of the profession relative to 
the defendant's negligence or misconduct. Twenty-three years after the 
enactment of Section 79C, it cannot definitively be stated that the statute 
has achieved its purpose. 
Nor is there a strong likelihood that judicial decisions will increase 
the efficiency of the present statute. In the opinion of this author, it is 
highly unlikely that the Supreme Judicial Court will reverse its position 
in the Reddington decision and take judicial notice of either the expertise 
of the author of a medical treatise or of the accuracy and usage of any 
collateral writing which purports to vouch for the expertise of the author 
of a medical treatise or writing. It is doubtful whether the expertise of 
the author of a medical writing can ever be a matter of such notoriety 
as to warrant the use of judicial notice.15 Even where the author's name 
has become a household word, his views may have subsequently become 
discredited or his conclusion disproved among his peers. With respect 
to a collateral writing, the issue is not so much whether the accuracy 
or use of the writing is a notorious fact but whether it actually purports 
to characterize the expertise of the author of the medical writing in 
question, and, if so, whether its author has the expertise to vouch for 
the expertise of the author of the medical writing. If the trial judge does 
not have the a:bility to determine by judicial notice that the author of 
a medical writing is an expert, how can such a matter be determined 
by the unknown author of a blurb appearing in Who's Who, the En-
cyclopedia Brittanica or Webster's Dictionary? Where the collateral 
writing or compilation is itself a kind of medical treatise, the same argu-
ments against the use of judicial notice apply to it as militated against 
use of judicial notice to vouch for the expertise of the author of the 
original writing. 
Thus, once again, it may be up to the legislature to re-examine the 
purpose of Section 79C. If it concludes that its goal remains a worth-
while objective, then it might well ponder new legislation to implement 
it. 
§15.6. Conclusion. These four topics are by no means exhaustive 
of the medical malpractice field. Indeed, this article has not discussed 
one of the most interesting and current problems in medical malpractice, 
the question of informed consent'! In informed consent cases, the doctor 
has allegedly obtained the patient's consent for certain medical treatment 
or surgery without having fully disclosed to the patient the risks involved 
in the treatment or surgery. The patient then falls victim to one of the 
undisclosed risks and sues the physician for malpractice. The principal 
issues in such cases are (1) whether the action sounds in battery for an 
§ 15.6. 1 This article has deliberately omitted a detailed discussion of informed 
consent because the issue has not yet arisen in Massachusetts. 
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unconsented touching because the consent was not informed or in negli-
gence because the doctor failed to exercise reasonable care in not dis-
closing all possible risks; and (2) whether expert testimony is required 
before a jury will be permitted to find liability. The majority view, 
drawn from recent cases in other junsdictions, is that the proper cause 
of action is negligence and that expert testimony is required. 2 There 
appear to be sound theoretical and practical reasons supporting those 
conclusions.3 
While special rules must occasionally be fashioned to deal with novel 
issues in medical malpractice such as informed consent, such questions 
can usually be satisfactorily analyzed by application of basic principles 
and underlying policies of medical malpractice law. 
STUDENT COMMENT 
§15.7. Planning for unplanned child litigation. The use of birth 
control pills and voluntary sterilization as methods of contraception and 
family planning has increased greatly in recent years. To those relying 
2 On the negligence-battery issue see Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 
P.2d 1093, rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); DeFiHippo 
v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 
(Tex. 1967); Kaplan v. Haines, 96 N.]. Super. 242, 232 A.2d 840 (1967), 
affirmed, 51 N.J. 404, 241 A.2d 235 (1968). For a case treating the matter as 
a battery, see Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 
(1958) (sterilization). See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §18, at 105-106, §32, 
at 165-166 (4th ed. 1971). 
The need for expert testimony is illustrated in Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 
229 (Texas 1967) where the plaintiff was able to establish the standard by 
the testimony of the defendant-doctor. The defendant-doctor testified that 
it was standard procedure to inform the patient that there was a risk (about 1 %) 
of the total hearing loss in a stapedectomy operation and that he told the plain-
tiff about the risk. The defendant's testimony established the standard despite the 
fact that the jury might disbelieve that the defendant complied with the standard 
in the particular case. 
3 The negligence theory appears to be the more accurate. Where a physician 
obtains the consent of a patient to surgery or other type of medical treatment by 
withholding information as to its potential risks but in no way deceives the 
patient as to the type of surgery or medical treatment itself, any fraud involved 
does not go to the essence of the touching and would therefore not appear to 
vitiate the consent. Furthermore, whether a particular patient, facing necessary 
and difficult surgery, should be informed of all the risks incident to such surgery 
is a question involving the exercise of reasonable care and sound medical' judg-
ment on the part of the doctor. Liability should not be automatically imposed 
upon a showing that the patient consented to the operation without being informed 
of the known risks incident thereto. 
On the second issue, since the disclosure of risks incident to surgery or other 
medical treatment is a matter of professional judgment, expert testimony should 
normally be required to support a jury's finding of negligence. Only in rare cir-
cumstances where the failure to inform coul'd be determined to be unreasonable 
based upon common knowledge and experience would expert evidence be un-
necessary. 
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upon the effectiveness of birth control, the failure of these products and 
procedures to prevent conception and the subsequent birth of an un-
planned child may be devastating. Years of family planning are wasted 
and great economic and social strain is placed upon already !\truggling 
couples. Single women must face the prospects of unwed motherhood, 
while single men are subject to paternity suits. The unplanned child may 
be the target of parental hostility. If his biological parents are not mar-
ried, such a child must also endure the legal and social stigmas of illegiti-
macy. Given the socially undesirable consequences of birth control failure, 
it is important that the legal implications of such failure be known and 
understood. 
The failure of birth control products and procedures has already re-
sulted in legal action against physicians, pharmacists and manufacturers 
in other jurisdictions.! These decisions illustrate the need to create a 
sound medico-legal policy capable of balancing the competing public 
policies and private interests involved in "unplanned child litigation." 
While such disputes have not yet reached the courts of Massachusetts, 
they will eventually demand legal resolution. This Comment, then, will 
create a framework through which the problems inherent in unplanned 
child litigation can be viewed. 
After beginning with a brief medical background and an analysis of 
pOSSible plaintiffs and defendants, the article will discuss causes of action 
against physicians, pharmacists and manufacturers. Particular emphasis 
will be placed upon the problems of proof confronting plaintiffs and 
defendants alike. Assuming that courts may recognize these causes of 
action, this Comment will discuss elements of damages and how recovery 
should be measured. The conclusion will locus upon three questions that 
a trial court must consider in deciding whether or not relief should be 
granted: whether the plaintiff has suffered an injury that the law should 
compensate; whether public policy allows for such compensation; and 
whether the court is the proper institution to afford compensation. 
I. MEDICAL BACKGROUND 
The vasectomy, or sterilization of the male, is a simple procedure 
which may be performed in thirty minutes in a doctor's office with the 
use of local anesthesia. The operation involves cutting and tying off the 
vas deferens so that sperm can no longer be ejaculated.2 Due to its high 
§15.7. 1 Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App.2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) 
(action against a physician based upon pre-operative conduct and failure of tubal 
ligation); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (action 
against a druggist who delivered a tranquilizer instead of the prescribed oral con-
traceptive); and Whittington v. Eli Lilly & Co., 333 F.Supp. 98 (S.D. W. Va. 
1971) (action against a phannaceutical company based upon the alleged failure 
of its oral contraceptive to prevent conception). 
2 Plann:<i Parenthood League of Massachusetts, The Operation of Vasectomy, 
1972 (available at the League's office in Newton, Mass.). 
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rate of success and relatively low cost,3 the vasectomy has become the 
most popular form of voluntary sterilization. Because the patient may 
still be carrying live sperm cells in his seminal vesicle, he is advised to 
use contraception until laboratory tests confirm complete sterilization. 
The testing period may last from six to twelve weeks.4 In rare cases the 
vas deferens may naturally fuse back together, thereby negating the effec-
tiveness of the vasectomy. Vasectomies are generally irreversible, and 
surgical reversals have enjoyed only limited success.5 
Tubal ligation, or sterilization of the female, blocks off the tubes which 
carry the egg from the ovary to the uterus. There are two basic methods 
of performing this operation. The older, salpingectomy, involves an ab-
dominal incision through which the tubes are cut and tied.6 Considered 
major surgery and requiring a week of hospitalization and several weeks 
for complete recovery, it is much more expensive than the vasectomy 
and recommended only when other types of surgery are to be performed 
at the same time. The newer method, laparoscopy, does not involve major 
surgery and is almost as inexpensive as the vasectomy. Through the use 
of special instruments a small piece of tube is removed and cauterized. 
The operation is performed under general anesthesia and requires only 
two small incisions near the navel. 7 Since the procedure is not considered 
major surgery, the patient may go home the next day. Tubal ligation 
is considered irreversible, and only rarely has surgical reversal been 
achieved. It is as effective as the vasectomy as a means of contraception.8 
The birth control pill works in several ways to prevent conception. It 
may stop the release of the egg, change the lining of the womb to make 
it difficult for the egg to implant, or alter the rate of egg transport from 
the ovary to the uterus so it arrives too early or too late for implantation. 
Thee are two main types of birth control pilI. The combination pill con-
tains both estrogen and progesterone, while the sequential pill contains 
one or the other and must be taken alternately during the menstrual 
3 Co~umer Reports, June, 1971, at 385. The chance of natural failure is 
about 0.5% and costs range from $50 to $175. 
4 Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, The Ope'ration of Vasectomy, 
1972, and Vasectomy; Male Sterilization, 1972 (available at the League's office 
in Newton, Mass.). 
5 Comment, Elective Sterilization, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 415, 417 (1965); P. 
Tierney, Voluntary Sterilization, A Necessary Alternative?, 4 Family L.Q. 373 
(1970). Two recent developments indicate ~hat a reversible sterilization may soon 
be available. The first, the Bionyx C~ntrol, contains a microv:alve which fits in-
side the sperm duct and may be turned to an "on" or "off" position, depending 
upon the user's desire to procreate. The second, the silicone plug, fits in the sperm 
duct, bl'ocks the flow of sperm, and may be removed when the user desires to 
procreate. Both of these developments have been praised and subjected to criticism. 
6 Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, Female Sterilization, 1972 
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cycle.9 While both types are considered "almost completely effective,"10 
the combination pill is more highly recommended,11 There are over 
twenty brands of oral contraceptives and physicians try to match patients 
with the product that physiologically is best suited to them. Of course, 
the ultimate effectiveness of the birth control pill depends on following 
the directions for its use. 
II. LEGALITY OF STERlLIZATION AND ORAL CONTRACEPTIVES IN 
MASSACHUSETTS 
Like most states Massachusetts has no specific law dealing with volun-
tary sterilization.12 Despite the fact that sterilizations are performed regu-
larly in the Commonwealth,13 doubts about their legality continue to be 
expressed.14 It has been suggested that sterilization is criminally punishable 
under the Mayhem Law. 15 Other jurisdictions with Mayhem statutes 
similar to the Massachusetts law have held that no criminal liability at-
taches to the physician performing a sterilization with the consent of 
the patient.16 The rationale is that the statute requires malice, an element 
which cannot be proved in this situation, and that the purpose and 
previous application of the statute preclude its use as a basis for prosecu-
tion,l7 This reasoning should be controlling in Massachusetts. 
It can also be argued that sterilization is punishable under anti-abortion 
statutes prohibiting unlawful attempts to procure miscarriage.18 Case law 
indicates that the pregnancy of a woman is not an essential element of 
the offense,19 However, the statute does require that the defendant act 
9 Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, Choosing a Contraceptive: 
The Pill, 1972 (available at the League's office in Newton, Mass.). 
10 Physician's Desk Reference (1972). The oral contraceptives of all manu-
facturers are listed as "almost completely effective." Planned Parenthood League 
literature describes the pill as 100% effeotive when taken as directed. See note 9, 
supra. 
11 Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, Choosing a Contraceptive: 
The Pill, 1972 (available at the League's office in Newton, Mass.). 
12 As of this writing only five states have specific legislation dealing w~th volun-
tary sterilization. See Ga. Code Ann. §§84-931 through 84-935 (Supp. 1972); 
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. §§69-6401 through 69-6406 (1970); N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§90-271 (Supp. 1971); Ore. Rev. Stat. §435.305 (1971); Va. Code Ann. §§32-423 
et. seq. (Supp. 1972). 
13 The Planned Parenthood League has a referral list of 57 doctors perform-
ing sterilizations and several Boston hospitals also perform the operations. 
14 In Hathaway v. Worcester City H~pital, 341 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Mass. 
1972), the court mentions that the C~ty Solicitor of Worcester advised the hos-
pital that performing a tubal ligation might be illegal under state law. However, 
the opinion did not state the legal basis for the City Solicitor's advice. 
15 G.L., c. 265, § 14 (195H). 
16 Jess'n v. County of Shasta, 274 Cal. App.2d 737, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1969). 
17 Id. at 747-48, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66. 
18 G.L., c. 27'2, §19 (1968). 
19 CJ;nmonwe:llth v. Cheng, 310 Mass. 293, 37 N.E.2d 1010 (1941). 
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"with the intent to procure the miscarriage of a woman."20 Since the 
intent to sterilize is to prevent future conception, it can hardly be con-
strued as an intent to procure a miscarriage. Furthermore, since no prose-
cutions have been brought under these statutes against persons perform-
ing sterilizations in Massachusetts, it appears that there are no operative 
criminal bars against the procedure in this Commonwealth. 
Indeed, a Massachusetts woman recently claimed a constitutional right 
to have a tubal ligation performed in a city hospital. In Hathaway v. 
W orceste'T City H ospital,21 the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment 
and an order compelling the hospital to perform the operation. The 
federal district court for the district of Massachusetts dismissed the plain-
tiff's complaint on the ground that no constitutional right to have the 
city hospital perform tubal ligations existed, particularly where no such 
procedure had been previously performed in that facility. The court 
ruled that it could not justify ordering the hospital to perform tubal 
ligations under a statute directing city hospitals to receive "persons re-
quiring relief during temporary sickness."22 The court could not attribute 
to the legislature an intent to make tubal ligations available because it 
viewed the operation as a "subject of grave political debate, as to which 
there is not even within the medical profession unanimity of view, and 
as to which the evidence shows Massachusetts hospitals have differing 
practices and policies. "23 The question, therefore, was one for the legis-
lature to decide. * 
The argument for the existence of a constitutional right to voluntary 
sterilization could be supported by reading Griswold v. Connecticut24 
20 G.L., c. 272, §19 (1968). 
21 341 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Mass. 1972). 
22 G.L., c. 40, §5 (20) (Supp. 1972). 
23 341 F. Supp. at 1387. 
24 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
25 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
*On March 22, 1973 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
ruled that Worcester City Hospital's refusal to perform voluntary sterilizations 
constituted a denial of equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 41 U.S.L.W. 2521 (April 3, 1973). This reversal of the District Court 
opinion discussed in this Comment appears to have been greatly facilitated by 
the United States Supreme Court decisions which permit abortion. Roe v. Wade, 
-U.S.-, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); Doe v. Batton, -U.S.-, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973). 
The Court of Appeals found that there was no compelling state interest justifying 
the bar on voluntary sterilization. It also expressed doubt that there could be a 
rational basis for banning sterilization since performing the procedure involved 
no greater risk and required no special staff or equipment. The Court of Appeals 
noted that a fundamental interest, the decision to terminate the possibilities of 
any future pregnancies, was akin to the decision to terminate a particular preg-
nancy. Whatever state interests affecting the decision to abort were far less com-
pelling in the decision to become sterile. Limiting the impact of its decision, the 
Court of Appeals indicated that it did not require the city or state to maintain the 
hospital, nor did it require the hospital to perform every therapeutic and non-
therapeutic form of surgery. What it did require was that once the state under-
22
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 18
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/18
392 1972 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §15.7 
and Eisenstadt v. Baird25 as applicable to several forms of birth control 
rather than to one form alone. Even if the reasoning in these cases is 
extended to voluntary sterilization, it does not require that the state make 
voluntary sterilization available in city hospitals. It would free the indi-
vidual from governmental interference with his or her decision whether 
or not to procreate, but the individual would still have to obtain volun-
tary sterilization from a private medical source. 
With regard to the legality of the use of oral contraceptives in Massa-
chusetts it seems clear that the Griswold case protects their use by mar-
ried persons and the Eisenstadt case extends this protection to unmarried 
persons.26 
III. PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS 
Assuming the legality of the use of birth control products and pro-
cedures by married and unmarried persons, the next point of considera-
tion is whether potential plaintiffs face any bars to recovery other than 
traditional defenses27 raised by defendants. Married persons do not appear 
to face such bars. If the wife is a user of an oral contraceptive or has been 
sterilized, she may bring a personal injury action when the product or 
procedure fails. Her husband may bring a statutory claim for her medical 
expenses.28 If the husband has had a vasectomy and the operation has 
failed, he may bring an action and his wife may also seek redress, since 
her unwanted pregnancy is well within the range of foreseeable conse-
quences of the defendant's alleged wrongful conduct.29 
took to provide general short tenn hospital care, it could not constitutionally 
distinguish between medically indistinguishable surgical procedures and impinge 
on a fundamental right. If the Court of Appeals decision stands, state and mun'ci-
pally operated hospitals will be obliged to perfonn voluntary sterii'izations, as in 
the instant case. This affinnative duty could become burdensome if private hos-
pitals balk at providing the operation, the demand for which will surely increase. 
It is unclear whether governmental hospitals are compei'led by the dec;sion to 
perfonn vasectomies, since the fundamental interest protected revolves around the 
woman's decision to prevent the possibility of future pregnancies. Whatever 
fundamental interest involved in the decision to have a vasectomy does not flow 
directly from Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Batton. Therefore, federal courts seeking 
to protect the decision to have a vasectomy will have to extend, rather than 
simply apply, Hathaway v. Worcester City Hospital. 
26 Griswold and Eisenstadt raise many questions about the existing state of 
contraceptive laws and are subiect to a number of interpretations. The pract:cal 
effect of Eisenstadt has been the extension of protection of use of birth control 
pills to unmarried persons. The Planned Parenthood League has also adopted the 
view that use of the pill is permissible in the case oJ married and unmarried 
persons. 
27 For the purpose of this Comment, statutes of limitations, contributory neg1;-
gence greater than 50%, and affirmative defenses of due care would be traditional 
de'enses. 
28 G.L., c. 231, §6A (1956). 
21 Cnsto:iio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App.2d 303, 316-17, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 472 
(1967) . 
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Unmarried persons, however, must contend with the argument that 
their violation of fornication laws30 bars their recovery in a civil action 
based upon the failure of birth control products and procedures. In 
Massachusetts, the plaintiff's violation of a criminal statute does not 
necessarily prevent his recovery: 
Such violation is considered 'evidence of negligence' on the part of 
the violator, as to all consequences that the statute was intended to 
prevent .... If, however, his violation of law was merely a condition 
or an attendant circumstance of his injury, and not a proximate con-
tributing cause, he may recover from the wrongdoer.31 
Under this standard the question becomes whether the unmarried plain-
tiff's act of intercourse constitutes a "proximate contributory clVuse;" 
if it does, then the unmarried plaintiff will be barred from recovery. 
Treating the act of intercourse as a "proximate contributory cause" 
and denying recovery to the unmarried plaintiff results in different legal 
outcomes in the cases of married and unmarried plaintiffs. In the case 
of married plaintiffs, the act of intercourse has been regarded as fore-
seeable conduct rather than as an independent intervening cause which 
relieves the defendant of liabiIity.32 In the case of unmarried plaintiffs, 
it appears that the opportunity to raise the foreseeability of intercourse 
as a fact allowing for recovery may be lost. However, there are several 
reasons for not applying the "evidence of negligence" standard to un-
married plaintiffs is unplanned child litigation. As a matter of justice be-
tween the parties the mere happenstance that the plaintiff is single should 
not preclude recovery. The state's interest in punishing the plaintiff is 
already vindicated by the criminal process, so further penalties SlUch as a 
bar to civil recovery should not be imposed. Furthermore, the state's 
interest might be adversely affected by a denial of recovery to the un-
married plaintiff; a civil wrongdoer would be freed from legal responsi-
bility to a large class of citizens, and the uncompensated mother and her 
child might well become an economic burden upon the state when the 
putative father is incapable of providing support.33 Treating unmarried 
persons differently from married persons in this situation would also raise 
equal protection questions. 34 
It is also possible that where unmarried persons have produced an il-
legitimate child, the child will claim injury arising out of his status as an 
30 G.L., c. 272, §18 (1968). 
31 Todd v. Traders & Mechanics Ins. Co., 230 Mass. 595, 598, 120 N.E.H2, 
144 (1918). 
32 Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App.2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Troppi 
v. Searl, 31 Mich. App. 240,187 N.W.2d 511 (1971). 
33 In these circumstances a putative father might attempt to shift the burden of 
child support payments to a potential defendant. 
34 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The court might avoid this argu-
ment by stating that the differentiation is between plaintiffs who have committed 
a criminal act and those who have not. 
24
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 18
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/18
394 1972 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §15.7 
illegitimate. The child plaintiff has numerous legal hurdles to clear 
before establishing a successful cause of action. The defendant may con-
tend that the plaintiff was not a person when the birth control product 
or procedure failed and therefore cannot maintain an action. In Massa-
chusetts, however, an injury to a non-viable fetus, later born alive but 
surviving only two and a half hours, enabled the child's administrator 
to sue under the Wrongful Death Act.36 Non-viability at the time of the 
defendant's conduct, then, should not deprive the illegitimate plaintiff 
of standing to bring a claim once he is born and his illegitimate status 
attaches.37 
Even if the child plaintiff establishes standing, defendants may con-
tend that their legal responsibility extends only to the plaintiff's birth 
and not to his illegitimacy; since the plaintiff's biological parents may 
marry before his birth and thereby legitimate him, it is their conduct alone 
which determines the legal status of the plaintiff. The child plaintiff 
must counter that one who sells birth control products and services to 
unmarried persons should foresee that a breach of duty will result in the 
birth of illegitimate children. Therefore, attempts by defendants to 
characterize the child plaintiff or his injury as too remote from their 
wrong should fail. The defendant must take the child plaintiff as he 
finds him. The fact that the child's biological parents could have mar-
ried and legitimized him does not relieve the defendant of liability to the 
child whose parents did not take that step. 
After establishing standing to sue and a duty on the part of the de-
fendant, the child plaintiff must satisfy the court that he has suffered an 
injury that should be compensated. He might point out the inequality 
under law between the legitimate child and himself as the basis of his 
injury.38 Despite such a showing, courts could deny the existence of a 
legally cognizable injury by ruling that the birth of the plaintiff is a 
benefit, which, as a matter of law, outweighs any injury claimed.39 AI-
35 Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App.2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, cert. den. 379 U.S. 
945 (1963); Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1967). Illegitimate children 
brought actions against their putative fathers and claimed that illegitimate statue 
constituted an injury for which compensation should be made. 
36 See Torigian v. Watertown News Co., Inc., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 
(1967). 
37 The court's reasoning in the Zepeda case should also be employed: 
The plaintiff is 'a person now and he was a potential person with full capacity 
for independent existence at the time of the original wrong. As he developed 
biologically from potentiality to reality the wrong developed too. It progresesd 
as did he, from essence to existence. When he became a person the nature of 
the wrong became fixed. From a moral wrong and a criminal act against the 
public it became a legal wrong and a tortious act against the individual. 41 
Ill. App.2d at 253, 190 N.E.2dat 855. 
In the Zepeda case ,the court also supported the view that a right of action existed 
by analogizing from other cases in which childl'en recovered when wrongs were 
committed before their conception. 
38 See, e.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). 
39 Shaheen v. Knig:ht, 11 Pa. D&C2d 41, 45, (C. P. Lycoming County, 1957). 
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ternatively, courts could defer the entire issue of recovery based upon 
illegitimacy to the legislature, reasoning that the legislature has been the 
traditional formulator of illegitimacy laws40 and that lack of precedent 
further restricts judicial action.41 
Defendants in unplanned child litigation will include physicians who 
perform sterilizations and prescribe birth control pills, lab technicians 
who test the effectiveness of sterilizations, pharmacists who receive and 
deliver prescriptions, and manufacturers of birth control pills. Because 
the conduct of potential defendants is often interwoven, plaintiffs would 
be well-advised to join all parties whose conduct might have led to their 
injury.42 Defendants themselves may seek to mitigate or discharge their 
own liability by claiming that another party was legally responsible for 
the plaintiff's injury. For example, the physician who relies upon a 
laboratory test result when advising his patient that a vasectomy has 
been successful might claim tha:t he performed the vasectomy carefully 
and that the lab technician negligently conducted the post-operative test. 
Since defendants are likely to attempt to shift liability to one another, 
it is important that each potential defendant become acquainted with 
the nature and extent of the legal duties of ather potential defendants. 
IV. LIABILITY OF PHYSICIANS, PHARMACISTS AND MANUFACTURERS 
Physicians. The primary liability of the physician is derived from his 
performance of sterilizations. In order to insulate himself from suit in 
this area, the physician should follow several guidelines of conduct. 
Before performing a sterilization, he should inform the patient about 
the nature of the procedure, the possibility that it may not succeed, the 
consequences of its success, the existence of any medical and psychological 
side effects, and the availability of alternative methods of contraception. 
The patient and, if married, his or her spouse as well, should be asked 
to sign a consent form indicating an understanding of the operation and 
. giving permission to the physician to perform it, and the form should be 
notarized.43 
The sterilization itself should be performed in accordance with the 
physician's standard of care.44 Translating this general standard into 
40 At common law the illegitimate child was "filius nullius" and had no rights 
unless iegitimated by a special act of Parliament. Legislative enactments have 
slowly removed some of the inequities between legitimate and illegitimate children 
and the legislature appears to have developed an evolutionary policy of equaliza-
tion. 
41 See Jorgensen v. Mead Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. 
Okla. 1972). The District Court would not provide a remedy for a Mongoloid 
child born as a result of the mother's use of an oml contraceptive. 
42 See Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971). 
43 Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, The Operation of Vasectomy, 
1972 (sample form available at the League's office in Newton, Mass.). 
44 See Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 109, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968). 
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specifics for sterilization requires a step by step medical familiarity with 
the operation. Therefore, plaintiffs should rely upon medical treatises 
and expert testimony45 in order to properly evaluate the correctness of 
the sterilization procedure. Establishing standards of care in the area 
of post-operative testing has also proved difficult. For example, in the 
Washington case of Ball v. Mudge,46 the failure to conduct post-operative 
tests was established, but the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed because 
no community standard of post-operative testing could be presented 
to the jury.47 More recently, in the Kentucky case of Hackworth v. Ha'rt,48 
the defendant physician gave one post-operative test and a three test 
standard was presented; however, the issue of negligence was allowed to 
go to the jury.49 The Ball case suggests that there may be a reluctance on 
the part of expert witnesses to testify against fellow physicians,50 and the 
Hackworth case intimates that trial courts may be reluctant to direct 
verdicts for the plaintiff in a new matter that involves multiple de-
fendants. 51 
Assuming that recognized standards of care will be developed in 
Massachusetts, the physician's failure to follow them may render him 
liable under several legal theories. Under the negligence theory the phy-
sician may be charged with improperly performing the sterilization 
operation, the post-sterilization tests, or both. Conception and birth by 
themselves do not conclusively establish a breach of the physician's duty 
to the plaintiff or the fact that such breach, if it did occur, Was the proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Natural recanalization of the vas 
deferens may have occurred despite the physician's exercise of due care.52 
The plaintiff may have failed to use contraception during the post-
operative testing period; even if the physician negligently ceased con-
ducting post-operative tests, the plaintiff's prior negligent failure to use 
contraception might relieve him from liability.53 Since conception and 
birth may be produced by causes other than negligent conduct of the 
defendant, the plaintiff may not employ a strict liability theory and in-
stead must prove the negligence of the physician and its causal connec-
tion to the resulting injury. 
In order to prove the physician's negligence the plaintiff must rely 
heavily upon expert testimony to establish the standard of care and show 
how the physician's conduct strayed from the standard and caused injury. 
45 Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 139, 181 N.E.2d 562, 565 (1962); 
see aiso, G.L., c. 233, §79C (Supp. 1972). 
46 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964). 
47 Id. at 249, 391 P.2d at 203. 
48 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971). 
49 Id. at 381. 
50 See note 47, supra. 
51 See note 48, supra. 
52 Comment, Elective Sterilization, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 415, 417 (1965). 
53 Such conduct could be found by a jury to be 50% or more negligent, suf-
ficient to bar recovery under the comparative negligence law. 
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In the case of the operation itself, the plaintiff may try to show that it was 
performed in such a way that recanalization was almost certain to occrur.54 
In the case of post-operative testing, the plaintiff may contend that the 
physician failed to instruct him to use contraception during the post-
operative testing period or prematurely advised him that the use of 
contraception was no longer necessary.55 
Of course, the physician may avail himself of several defenses. He 
may raise a statute of limitations to bar the plaintiff's action com-
pletely.56 Under the statute applicable to malpractice suits in tort or 
contract, the plaintiff must bring suit within a three year period which 
commences at the time the cause of action accrues.57 The physician may 
also contend that he was not negligent in any respect or that the plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent and responsible for the unplanned 
pregnancy.58 
Physicians may also face claims based upon a theory of negligent 
misrepresentation if they advise a patient that a sterilization will succeed 
or that intercourse without the use of contraception can be safely en-
gaged in immediately after the operation. Since this conduct on the 
part of the defendant also gives rise to a negligence claim, which does 
not require proof of the plaintiff's justifiable reliance thereon, it is likely 
that the theory of negligent misrepresentation will be advanced sparingly. 
Plaintiffs may also claim that the physician is liable for breach of con-
tract. While physicians are generally held not to warrant a specific result 
or cure,59 their conduct may overcome this presumption.60 When a phy-
sician expressly guarantees to accomplish a result and fails to do so, 
liability will attach. However, few physicians will make such a guarantee 
in writing, if at all. Consequently the plaintiff generally bears the burden 
of proving the existence and the terms of the contract by parole evidence 
statements made by the defendant to his patient that the sterilization 
would be a complete success.61 In deciding whether to give the words 
the effect of a binding promise, the law must distinguish between a 
formal and express guarantee and the everyday assurances given to relax 
the patient. The making of this distinction is usually left to the jury as 
a question of fact.62 The test used is what a reasonable man would be-
54 Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App.2d 303, 312 n.5, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 469 
n.5 (1967). 
55 See Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971). 
56 G.L., c. 260, §4 (1970). 
57 Id.; In the case of sterilization, the cause of action accrues at the time of 
the opertation and not when the damage occurs or is discovered. The statute has 
been construed in this manner by Pasquale v. Chandler, 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 
319 (1966). 
58 See note 53, supra. 
59 Hunt v. Bradshaw, 251 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1958). 
60 Colvin v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1949). 
61 In this instance the hearsay rule may limit plaintiff's effort to sustain his 
burden of proof. 
62 See note 60, supra. 
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lieve after hearing the physician's words.63 Unless the physician's con-
versation clearly states a guarantee of success, it is doubtful that the 
plaintiff can sustain his burden of proof. The presumption that physi-
cians do not guarantee rewlts aids the defendant physician greatly. 
Furthermore, if the plaintiff signed a consent form indicating his under-
standing that the sterilization might not succeed, then a second pre-
sumption will arise that the physician did not orally guarantee success. 
Given the great difficulty of proving the existence of an oral contract 
to sterilize and a guarantee of medical success, causes of action based 
upon contract will probably enjoy only limited success. 
A second source of physician's liability would be the negligent trans-
mittal of a prescription to the pharmacist. Prescriptions for the oral 
contraceptive are made by telephone or by written note. If the physi-
cian calls for a drug other than the one that he intends to prescribe 
then he becomes responsible for injury resulting from his negligent con-
duct. Plaintiffs will confront problems of proof where telephoned pre-
scriptions are involved. The physician may honestly believe that he asked 
the druggist to supply the plaintiff with a specific oral contraceptive, 
and the druggist may assert just as adamantly that the physician told 
him to supply something else. The plaintiff would be wise to name both 
the physician and the druggist in his complaint when faced with such 
problems of memory and credibility. The defendants, of course, may 
contend that the plaintiff knew that the drug was supposed to be an oral 
contraceptive and should have known from the name and appearance of 
the drug whether or not it was the correct product. The success of this 
contention, of course, depends upon the facts of a given case.64 
Pharmacists. The druggist delivers oral contraceptives to customers 
after receiving a written or telephoned prescription from the customer's 
physician. He should be certain that he understands the oral or written 
directions of the physician before filling the prescription. In Massa-
chusetts the druggist who delivers a drug other than the one prescribed 
can be held liable for resulting injury on negligence grounds.65 The 
Michigan decision of Brown v. Marshall66 explains the policy behind the 
druggist's liability as well as the extent of his duty: 
The case, it must be conceded, is one in which a very high degree 
of care may justly be required. People trust not merely their health 
but their lives to the knowledge, care and prudence of druggists, and 
in many cases a slight want of care is liable to prove fatal to some 
63 See C. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS 10 (1965). 
64 If the plaintiff were a new user of the product, she might not be held to know 
its name or appearance. The plaintiff was a new user in Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. 
App.2d 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971), and she did not confront the contention 
that she should have known the name or appearance of the birth control pilI. 
65 Nesci v. Angelo, 249 Mass. 508, 144 N.E. 287 (1924); Andreotala v. Gaeta, 
260 Mass. 105, 156 N.E. 731 (1927). 
66 47 Mich. 576, 11 N.W. 392 (1882). 
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one. It is therefore proper and reasonable that the care required 
shall be proportioned to the danger involved.67 
Given the existence of precedent and the policy of holding druggists 
liable for their mistakes, the druggist in Massachusetts who delivers a 
substance other than the prescribed oral contraceptive will probably be 
held responsible for his conduct. 
Plaintiffs will have to prove that a misdelivery has occurred. In cases 
involving telephoned prescriptions, the plaintiff will encounter the prob-
lems previously mentioned under claims against physicians based upon 
negligent prescription. Where the prescription was in writing, it will be 
of little use if the patient or pharmacist has destroyed it. The plaintiff's 
best sources of proof are the drug and its container and the records of 
the physician and pharmacist. 
The druggist's defenses are rather limited. He may set up the statute 
of limitations, claim that the physician prescribed the wrong drug, claim 
that the plaintiff should have known that the drug delivered was not the 
oral contraceptive prescribed, or claim that the plaintiff never used any 
of the drugs delivered and that the misdelivery was not causally related 
to the unplanned pregnancy. 
Manufacturers. Manufacturers will face liability when the oral con-
traceptive fails to prevent conception. Claims may be based upon the-
ories of negligence, breach of warranty, deceit and perhaps, strict lia-
bility. There are three elements of the plaintiff's case which must be 
proved regardless of what theory she pursues: the existence of a defective 
product; the defendant's responsibility for the defect; and the causal 
connection between the defect and the unwanted pregnancy. 
Proving the existence of a product defect will not be a simple mat-
ter. When the pill has been ineffective for the plaintiff and no proof of 
a defect is presented other than the facts that the plaintiff used the pill 
and became pregnant, the plaintiff has not sustained her burden of 
proof under a theory of negligence. The injury to the plaintiff alone does 
not create an inference of product defectiveness.68 If the plaintiff can 
check manufacturer's records and pharmacist's prescription records to 
determine who else has used pills from the same control group, she might 
be able to show that others have been injured and thereby strengthen 
the inference that the pills were defective. In order to defeat an inference 
of defectiveness the defendant can subject the pills in question to chemi-
cal testing and determine whether or not they conform to standards set 
for marketability. Since proof of defectiveness or effectiveness by such 
testing may be difficult and conclusive findings might not be achievable 
67 Id. at 583, 11 N.W. at 395. 
68 Absent other proof of a product defect, the injury to the plaintiff alone is 
not enough to establish a causal connection between the product and the injury. 
See Jacquot v. Will. Filene's Sons Co., 337 Mass. 312, 149 N.E.2d 635 (1958). 
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in all circumstances,69 expert testimony and its credibility will playa de-
terminative role in the development of product liability actions and 
defenses. 
While the manufacturer's responsibility for a defect may be easily estab-
lished, the causal connection between the defect, if established, and the 
plaintiff's unwanted pregnancy could be difficult to prove or disprove. 
Sustaining this burden of proof will call for expert testimony. In an area 
where expertise has not really developed, the plaintiff who must con-
front a well-trained staff of pharmaceutical house scientists and phy-
sicians is placed at a serious disadvantage. On the other hand, when a 
jury believes that a defect exists and sees that the plaintiff has conceived, 
it might rely more upon its common perceptions than upon its understand-
ing of the defense's scientific arguments. 
Even if the oral contraceptive is not deemed defective the manu-
facturer may have a duty to warn the public that it does not always 
work effectively. In some circumstances, the duty to warn will exist even 
though only a small number of users will be affected by product failure.7o 
But a court may rule that because the pill is almost perfect and the 
number of persons affected is negligible, no duty to warn should be 
required. On the other hand, it might hold that brochure language like 
"virtually 100% protection,"71 and Physician's Desk Reference language 
like "almost completely effective"72 provide an adequate warning of the 
risk of failure. 
Brochure phrases could conceivably constitute grounds for an action 
in deceit. These phrases intimate that the pill is completely effective 
when taken as directed. The average consumer may not be able to dis-
tinguish between "virtually 100% protection" and absolute protection 
in assessing the degree of risk of product failure associated with the pill. 
While the Physician's Desk Reference language, "almost completely ef-
fective"73 more clearly expresses the possibility of product failure, it 
may not be reasonable for manufacturers to rely upon physicians to con-
vey this information to patients, nor socially desirable to permit manu-
facturers to address vague or misleading language to the consumer. This 
vague language could easily induce the consumer to select the pill as a 
method of contraception. Any impact that this language might have as 
a warning is negated when the consumer reads the language as a state-
ment of product effectiveness. In order to reduce claims based upon 
brochure language and provide the consumer with a more accurate and 
simple explanation of the risk of product failure, manufacturers should 
69 The plaintiff may have consumed all of the product alleged to be defective. 
It is debatable whether inferences may be drawn from testing other pills in the 
same prescription or control group. 
70 Cornish v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1967). 
71 Whittington v. EH Lilly & Co., 333 F. Supp. 98, 100 (S.D. W.Va. 1971). 
72 Physician's Desk Reference 918 (1972). 
73 Id. at 918. 
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indicate the tested effectiveness of the pill and the circumstances under 
which the pill will fail to prevent conception. The fact that planned 
parenthood literature states that the pill is completely effective when 
taken as directed underscores the need for a change in brochure language. 
The failure of the pill to prevent conception may result in an action 
based upon the manufacturer's breach of express and implied warranties 
of fitness for a particular purpose. In the first instance the court must de-
termine whether or not an express or implied warranty of fitness exists. In 
Whittington v. Eli Lilly & Co.74 it was held that a brochure stating, 
"when taken as directed, the tablets offer virtually 100% protection"75 
did not rise to an express or implied warranty of fitness. The court 
granted the defendant's motion for a summary judgment. Relying upon 
Webster's Dictionary, the court construed "virtually" as meaning "less 
than absolutely" in reaching the result that no warranty of complete 
effectiveness was extended. While stating that the pill was "clearly rea-
sonably safe for use by the public as an oral contraceptive"76 it cau-
tioned, "in the very nature of things it cannot be totally and absolutely 
effective."77 Given the ostensible impossibility of complete regulation of 
the reproductive process, the Whittington court indicated that the manu-
facturer should not be liable to a plaintiff whose physiological idiosyn-
crasies contributed to the product failure. 78 
If the brochure in Whittington did not create an express or implied 
warranty of absolute fitness for a particular purpose, what did it create? 
On one hand the language could be treated as a disclaimer limiting the 
manufacturer's warranty from absolute effectiveness to almost absolute 
effectiveness. On the other hand, it could be treated as the only type 
of warranty that a manufacturer can offer, assuming that it is currently 
impossible to completely regulate the reproductive process. Under either 
views the brochure would not extend a warranty of absolute effective-
ness, as Mrs. Whittington alleged. Given the Whittington Court's em-
phasis on the unpredictability of the reproductive process, it undoubtedly 
adhered to the latter interpretation of the brochure language. If a 
Massachusetts Court differed on this factual issue and assumed that the 
pill would be 100% effective when taken as directed, then brochure 
language seeking to limit the manufacturer's warranty might be negated 
by section 2-316A of the Massachusetts Uniform Commercial Code.79 
Under this section consumer goods and services are not subject to war-
ranty exclusions or modifications. If the pill is not treated as a con-
sumer good then brochure language may be used as a disclaimer as well 
74 333 F. Supp. 98 (S.D. W.Va. 1971). 
75 Id. at 100. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 100-01. 
78 Id. at 101. 
79 G.L., c. 106, §2-316A (Supp. 1972). 
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as an inducement to purchase the pill. Such a result would be contrary 
to a strong state consumer protection policy.8o 
If a Massachusetts court assumes, as in Whittington, that a warranty 
of absolute effectiveness cannot possibly be extended, it must then decide 
how relevant this assumption is to the issue of the manufacturer's liability. 
On one hand, the court could follow a line of cosmetic cases which 
draws a distinction between instances where the product is ineffective 
for a particular user and situations where it is defective under phar-
maceutical standards.81 The manufacturer is insulated from liability 
except in cases where the plaintiff proves the existence of a defect in the 
product and its oausal connection to her injury. The unusually suscepti-
ble plaintiff will be denied recovery. On the other hand, the court could 
distinguish the cosmetic cases from the circumstance of contraceptive 
failure on the grounds that effectiveness is of greater importance to in-
dividual users who rely on the pill, and the potential hann resulting from 
the failure of the pill is much greater to society as a whole. If the pill 
is distinguishable, then the truth or falsity of the assumption that the 
pill cannot be completely effective becomes irrelevant. The court would 
be free to impose a strict liability based upon product ineffectiveness as 
well as defectiveness. 
Strict liability presents many problems for manufacturers and an 
awareness of them might persuade the courts not to adopt a strict lia-
bility approach. On one hand, if it is technologically impossible to pro-
duce the perfect pill, then the manufacturer should not be liable for freak 
occurrences of failure that cannot be guarded against. If strict liability 
claims are allowed, plaintiffs need only allege that they took the pill as 
directed; proof of a defect would be unnecessary. Given its difficult 
burden of proving product misuse, manufacturers might confront fraudu-
lent claims and be forced to absorb the extraordinary costs of large scale 
product liability litigation. Because little can be done to improve the 
present effectiveness of the pill, the manufacturer would have no chance 
to correct the conduct giving rise to liability. Under these circumstances, 
some manufacturers might be forced out of business or forced to curtail 
the development and improvement of its products. 
There are also strong arguments in favor of imposing strict liability. 
The manufacturer profits from the pill, and may socialize the risk of 
loss through insurance. The cost of insurance would then be spread 
among consumers rather than requiring that a few persons bear the 
costs of product failure. While plaintiffs would not have to prove the 
existence of a defect they would still have to show calUsation, and that 
is by no means easy. The mere fact that fraudulent claims might be made 
has not barred recovery in other circumstances and should not do so 
80 See G.L., c. 106, §2-318 (Supp. 1972). 
81 The cosmetic cases distinguish between defective prodUICts and those caus-
ing injury to 'an unusually susceptible plaintiff. See, e.g., Jacquot v. Wm. Filene's 
Sons Co., 337 Mass. 312, 149 N.E.2d 635 (1958). 
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here. If the court does consider treating the failure of the pill in strict 
liability fashion, it should at least take into account the above considera-
tions in reaching its result. 
V. DAMAGES 
Presuming for the moment that plaintiffs can successfully develop 
causes of action against potential defendants, it still remains for the trial 
court to formulate the measure of damages that may be recovered. Po-
tential elements of recovery are the medical expenses surrounding an 
unplanned pregnancy and birth, pain and suffering, loss of earning ca-
pacity,82 the husband's collateral claim for his wife's medical expenses, 
the cost of raising the unplanned child to the age of majority, and, if 
the parents are unmarried, the illegitimacy of the unplanned child. All 
but the last element have been successfully presented in unplanned child 
litigation,83 and all but the last two elements have already been recog-
nized as legitimate elements of injury in Massachusetts.84 
The prospect of granting recovery for the cost of raising the unplanned 
child to the age of majority has raised signals of judicial distress. How-
ever, courts in California and Michigan have decided that recovery for 
this element of injury should not be disallowed, but rather, reduced by 
any benefit that the plaintiff may have received as a result of the birth 
of the unplanned child.86 The reasoning behind this result is based upon 
an application of a "benefits rule:" 
Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the 
plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred upon the 
plaintiff a special benefit to the interest which was harmed, the value 
of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, where 
this is equitable.87 
The application of the benefits rule, praised extensively by commentators,88 
allows the jury to consider the full extent of the plaintiff's injuries 
while recognizing that the birth of an unplanned child is not devoid of 
measurable benefit in all circumstances. It is flexible enough to apply to 
a variety of plaintiffs whose injuries and benefits, if any, differ greatly. 
For example, the benefit received by the unmarried plaintiff, wealthy 
plaintiff and welfare plaintiff would differ, as would the injury suffered. 
82 Shea v. Rettie, 287 Mass. 454, 192 N.E. 44 (1934). 
83 See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 CaL App.2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). 
84 Neither of the last two elements have ever been claimed in Massachusetts. 
85 Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (dictum). 
86 Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App.2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Troppi 
v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App.2d 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971). 
87 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, §920 (1939). 
88 Note, Damages-The Not So Blessed "Blessed Event," 46 N.C. L. Rev. 
948 (1968); Note, Unplanned Parenthood and the Benefits Rule, 8 Wake Forest 
L. Rev. 159 (1971). 
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Despite its attractiveness, the benefits rule has been challenged by 
some commentators as inapplicable to unplanned child litiga:tion.89 It 
has been asserted that damages resulting from an invasion of one interest 
are not diminished by the showing of a benefit to anoth~r interest.9o 
Since the benefits rule specifies that the benefit conferred must be to 
the interest harmed, no benefit accrues at all if it attaches to an unin-
jured interest of the plaintiff. While this reasoning may be appealing in 
theory, in practice, courts may find it difficult to separate the injury and 
benefit received by the plaintiff into different categories of interest. The 
task of separation may tend to invite semantic debate a:t the expense of 
the disposition of justice, but if courts can define the benefit accruing to 
the plaintiff and identify it with an injury suffered without resorting 
to semantic debate, then the benefits rule can work successfully. 
A second objection to the benefits rule is the fact that when the plain-
tiff can prove that the benefit was unwanted, and hence, no benefit at 
all, he should be able to avoid the application of the rule completely.91 
There are references to the benefits rule in Massachusetts, but nothing 
which indicates that the plaintiff could avoid its application by this 
reasoning.92 It therefore appears that if the benefits rule is applied in 
unplanned child litigation, defendants may use it to mitigate damages. 
Defendants may attempt to mitigate da:mages in other ways as well. 
In order to completely bar, or, at least, reduce the plaintiff's recovery, 
they can allege that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent and his re-
covery should be barred or reduced in accordance with the comparative 
negligence law.93 Defendants might also demand that the plaintiff take 
certain steps to reduce the damage suffered. For exa:mple, they might 
claim that the plaintiff should have an a:bortion or at least place the 
unplanned child for adoption. Such claims should fail on two counts. 
They ignore the fact that state policies encourage fa:milies to stay to-
gether rather than separate and that the doctrine of mitigation requires 
that plaintiffs use only reasonable means to mitigate da:mages.94 In light 
of current laws and social values it is doubtful that courts would consider 
abortion and adoption within the realm of reasonable means. 
VI. CONCLUSION: RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST ALLOWING 
RECOVERY 
Although, as discussed, supra, plaintiffs may be able to fashion causes 
of action based upon common law and statutory concepts, they will re-
cover nothing unless they can also convince the courts that they have 
89 A. Sheppard, Negligent Interference with Birth Control Practices, 11 S. 
Texas L.J. 229 (1970). 
90 Restatement of Torts, §920(b) (1939). 
91 Restatement of Torts, §920(f) (1939). 
92 See, e.g., Magnolia Metal Go. v. Gale, 189 Mass. 124,75 N.E. 219 (1905). 
93 G.L., c. 231, §85 (Supp. 1972). 
94 Quaranto v. Silverman, 345 Mass. 423,428,187 N.E.2d 859,863 (1963). 
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suffered injuries which the courts should compensate. Three rationales 
have been suggested as the basis for denying a judicial remedy to plain-
tiffs involved in unplanned child litigation: (1) recovery would be con-
trary to public policy;95 (2) As a matter of law the birth of a healthy 
child is a benefit to the plaintiff which outweighs the alleged wrong ;96 
and (3) any remedy should be formulated by the legislature.97 A care-
ful analysis of these three rationales will show whether any of them are 
persuasive with regard to one or more potential plaintiffs. 
The denial of recovery on the grounds that recovery is contrary to 
public policy stems from the belief that the defendant should not have 
to pay for the cost of raising the unplanned child while the child's parents 
enjoy raising the child and IUse personally the funds supposedly designated 
for his support. It has been further contended that allowing recovery 
will disturb the traditional family values and structure and cause psy-
chological harm to the unplanned child.98 These contentions do not ap-
pear to be warranted. Parents, wed or unwed, when faced with the re-
sponsibility of the conception and birth of an unplanned child, may well 
need an award of damages to offset the expenses resulting from that 
conception and birth. Since many of these expenses are incurred before 
an award of damages is made, a substantial part of the award will prob-
ably be used to offset them. The fear that parents will squander an award 
intended for the benefit of the unplanned child is not a sufficient reason 
for denying recovery; however, where a court feels that such a fear is 
justified, it might impress a constructive trust for the benefit of the child 
on a portion of the damages to be designated for child support. 
The belief that allowing recovery disturbs family life and the life of 
the unplanned child is arguably insupportable. The burden of the un-
planned child upon married or unmarried parents is often severe. If 
an unplanned child is born, he may be resented by his parents or forced 
to endure the legal and social stigmas of illegitimacy. Allowing recovery 
in these situations could only ease some of the burdens that plaintiffs 
must bear. The unplanned child would not create as much financial or 
social strain for his parents, and he might be assured of a healthier family 
environment as a result. 
The rationale that recovery in unplanned child litigation is against pub-
lic policy is further undermined by the countervailing public policy posi-
tion that a wrongdoer should pay for the wrong he has committed and 
that the injured party should be compensated for the injury suffered. 
Denying recovery could lead to a relaxation of professional standards 
95 Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D&C2d 41 (C.P. Lycoming County, 1957). 
96 Id.; Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (dictum). 
97 Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App.2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, cert. den. 379 U.S. 
945 (1963). The injury claimed in the Zepeda case is analogous to that claimed 
by the unplanned child. In Zepeda recognidon of a remedy for this injury was 
deferred to the legislature. 
98 Note, 9 Utah L.J. 808 (1965). 
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among potential defendants once they realized that the law would insulate 
them from liability. Such a relaxation could result in a greater number of 
unplanned pregnancies and thus be inimical to private and public policies 
of family planning.99 
Even if a court does not believe that public policy favors birth control, 
it should not manufacture public policy from its own social and moral 
views to defeat recovery as against public policy: 
The right of a court to declare what is or is not in accord with pub-
lic policy does not extend to specific economic or social problems 
which are controversial in nature and capable of solution only as a 
result of a study of various factors and conditions. tOO 
Since it is arguable that birth control and recovery in unplanned child 
litigation are consonant with public policy and since the rationale that 
recovery is against public policy has been undermined, the court should 
not employ this rationale to defeat recovery by potential plaintiffs. 
The second rationale that birth is a benefit as a matter of law is an 
insufficient basis for denying recovery to potential plaintiffs in unplanned 
child litigation. The notion that a parent could reap economic benefit 
from a child put to work in the factory or on the farm is generally in-
consistent with modem reality. While parents may enjoy the love and 
affection of another child, this benefit is arguably outweighed by the 
economic and social problems of raising an unplanned child. Unmarried 
plaintiffs, faced with giving birth out of wedlock, paternity suits and 
forced marriages, certainly suffer greater damage than benefit when the 
unplanned child is conceived and born. Given these circumstances, the 
court should not decide against recovery as a matter of law; instead, it 
should submit the issue of recovery to the jury, taking into account the 
relevant circumstances of the parental plaintiffs. 
The unplanned child might not overcome the argument that his birth 
is a benefit which outweighs the injury arising from his illegitimate status. 
If confronted with this benefits argument, he should claim that the 
benefit of birth and the injury of illegitimacy involve two different in-
terests and that the benefit was an unwanted one which should not be 
used to defeat his recovery. If he cannot sidestep the application of the 
benefit rationale, then the illegitimate child plaintiff will not recover. 
Applying traditional criteria for judicial deference to legislative ac-
99 The state has an interest in i,ts citizens' raising families within their means 
of support. When private efforts of family planning fail, the state interest suffers. 
More persons may be forced into welfare and a higher rate of illegitimacy may 
occur. 
100 Mamlin v. Genoe, 340 Pa. 320, 325, 17 A.2d 407, 409 (1941). 
tOI Courts often defer decisions to the legislature for a number of reasons. In 
the absence of favorable precedent and cases which enable the application or rea-
sonable expansion of previously developed principles to the instant oase, the court 
may be reluctant to make what it believes to be new law. A court may also hestitate 
to decide a case when the decision requires it to infringe upon an area of law 
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tion lO1 to the circumstances of unplanned child litigation indicates that 
courts need not deny relief to plaintiffs on the ground that the legislature 
is the only proper source of a remedy. A body of precedent in favor of 
recovery has been developed outside of Massachusetts where married 
persons have brought daims against physicians and pharmacists.102 While 
these decisions are not binding authority in Massachusetts, they are per-
suasive and have been utilized by other courts that have subsequently 
decided in favor of recovery.103 The case of Whittington v. Eli Lilly & 
Co.104 denied recovery based upon the failure of a birth control pill to 
prevent conception. However, it should not be persuasive in Massachu-
setts. In West Virginia, where Whittington was decided, there was no 
Uniform Commercial Code provision like the Massachusetts provision 
which restricts a manufacturer's right to limit express and implied war-
ranties on consumer goods.105 If Massachusetts courts construe this pro-
vision as including birth control pills, then Whittington would not pre-
vent recovery. Furthermore, Whittington is predicated upon a belief that 
the birth control pill is not 100% effective when taken as directed and 
that the manufacturer's brochure adequately conveyed this fact. Massa-
chusetts courts are free to differ on one or both of these matters; they 
may even elect to hold the manufacturer strictly liable when the birth 
control pill is ineffective, rather than defective. Since Massachusetts 
courts are not bound by the reasoning of Whittington, they should not be 
ineluctably chained to its result. 
Although no comparable precedents have been established with re-
gard to unmarried plaintiffs, courts in Massachusetts should be free to 
formulate a policy favoring recovery. The right of the unmarried plain-
tiff to recover will generally depend upon the same set of facts that gives 
rise to the married plaintiff's right to recover. The legal theories upon 
which recovery can be based are also the same. While the policy sup-
porting recovery for unmarried plaintiffs differs from that supporting 
the married plaintiff's recovery, it should be sufficiently strong to war-
rant the extension of a judicial remedy. 
The illegitimate child seeking judicial relief faces several obstacles. 
Cases in other jurisdictions involving claims of illegitimacy as injury have 
traditionally developed by the legislature. The cowrt might believe that extended 
legislative debate and drafting are more conducive to the development of a remedy 
and an express public policy than judicial decision. 
102 See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App.2d 393, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); 
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App.2d 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971). 
103 Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616 (Del. Super. 1971). 
104 333 F. Supp. 98 (S.D. W.Va. 1971). 
105 G.L., c. 106, §2-316A (Supp. 1972). 
106 Unmarried users of birth control products and procedures should be com-
pensated when injured and civil wrongdoers should not be relieved of liability to 
so large a class of persons from whom they profit. The unplanned child should 
be supported by his parents or through an award of damages, but in any case, 
the burden of support should not fall upon the state. 
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deferred the granting of a remedy to the legislature.107 Furthermore, 
claims of prenatal-postnatal physical injury resulting from the conduct 
of physicians and the products of manufacturers have also been deferred 
to the legislature.108 Because a policy favoring recovery for these relatively 
unique injuries had not been established and precedents for recovery 
were not available, the courts did not elect to afford judicial relief. 109 
Massachusetts courts would thus lack precedent upon which to base a 
decision granting recovery to the illegitimate plaintiff. They might fur-
ther hesitate to grant recovery because laws relating to the rights of the 
illegitimate have been initially a matter for the legislature. Given this 
legal background, it is unlikely that Massachusetts common law will pro-
vide the illegitimate plaintiff with a remedy. Finally the broad social 
implications of making illegitimacy a compensable injury will reinforce 
the reluctance of the courts to provide recovery. 
In the first instance, then, the trial court must decide if it is the proper 
body to address the questions presented by unplanned child litigation. 
If the trial court chooses to address these questions, it must decide if 
public policy favors full recovery, partial recovery or no recovery at all. 
If some form of recovery is in order, an assessment of the "benefits rule" 
should be made. The social impact of allowing recovery will be great. 
Defendant's insurance costs might rise and this increase passed on to the 
consumers of the birth control business. Hospitals seeking to limit lia-
bility might limit the availability of tubal ligation to cases of medical 
necessity and cases where the age-parity ratiollO is satisfied. The unwilling-
ness of the medical profession to sterilize single persons will undoubtedly 
increase. If the illegitimate child can recover on the basis of his status, 
then the legislature might be moved to remove the legal inequalities be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate children. Manufacturers might well 
be instructed to modify their birth control pill brochures so that the 
effectiveness of the product is clearly explained and the conditions under 
which the product will fail are clearly enumerated. Hopefully the legal 
process will develop a sound approach to these social and legal problems 
which arise in the context of unplanned child disputes. 
107 See note 97, supra. 
108 See note 41, supra. 
109 Id. 
ALAN D. MANDL 
110 McCabe v. Nassau County Medical Center, 453 F.2d 698, 700 (2d Cir. 
1971) ; See also P. Forbes, Voluntary Sterilization of Women as a Right, 18 DePaul 
L. Rev. 560 (1969). 
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